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PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF CLASS SUITS*
Joseph ]. Simeonet
complexity of contemporary society constantly creates new
stresses on judicial administration. Ingenuity is called for to
produce new methods 1 ( or to modify and streamline old methods) in
order to alleviate congested dockets,2 avoid lengthy jury trials,3 and
in general to liberalize traditional rules of procedure and evidence
with the object of furthering the quick and efficient disposition of
disputes. Instances of progress toward achieving these ends include
the introduction of workable rules for discovery, pre-trial conferences and summary and declaratory judgments, the abolition of
technical and dilatory tactics in pleading, and the liberalization of
such remedies as interpleader and intervention.
But modernization of the so-called "class" or "representative"
suit as a procedural device has not kept pace to meet the needs of
contemporary society. The present study is proffered to demonstrate the fact of that lag, to trace its causes, and to support the conclusion that legislation in the form of a model or uniform law is
now needed to make the representative suit a more useful member
of the modern family of remedies.
In the past several decades the courts have been called upon
to resolve controversies in which numerous persons may have
acquired separate and distinct rights against a common adversary
because of a single fact-event. 4 Obvious examples include monopolistic practices damaging numerous potential competitors or cus-
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• This article is a part of a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of The University
of Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the S.J.D. degree.
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t Professor of Law, St. Louis University.-Ed.
1 Judge Yankwich in "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41 (1953), has commented
at 42: "As societies become more complex and law becomes more formalized, the legal
conflicts which arise take on the complexity of the materials out of which they arise. The
determination of these conflicts calls not only for greater social control, but also, for
procedural schemes that will enable judicial bodies to handle the complex problems and
do so efficiently."
2 See the series of articles in Symposium, Lagging Justice, 328 Annals 7-163 (March
1960).
3 Palmer, On Trial: The Jury Trial, 20 F.R.D. 65 (1958).
4 Since the adoption of the federal rules there have been approximately 225 reported
decisions in the federal courts and some 200 reported cases in the state courts. Contrast
this with only sixteen cases in the American Digest before 1900.
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tomers,5 overcharges by a public utility upon the citizenry of a
whole city,6 and fraudulent activities injuring numerous victims. 7
The unique virtue of the representative suit, once made available, is that it enables a court, once and for all in a single action,
to dispose of the issues in such cases which are the same as to each
of many persons too numerous for all to be joined. A dramatic
example would be the commission of a mass tort. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, might be personally injured by an explosion of
combustible material, by a fire at a crowded place, or by emissions
of an atomic reactor gone awry. It would be naive to expect comparable problems not to become more usual, even more acute.
Recently, for example, the United States was sued, after it had
conducted a series of nuclear tests, for damages for the loss of sheep
suffering lesions which might have been explainable as side effects
of nuclear radiation. 8 While the court found no causal connection
between the injury and the nuclear tests in this instance, the occurrence of such claims will undoubtedly increase. In common situations if multiple, separate but identical claims continue to have to
be tried entirely separately, prohibitive burdens well may be
placed upon already overburdened judicial systems which might
give cause for the establishment of additional administrative or
quasi-judicial machinery to dispose of them, further ousting courts
from their proper adjudicatory sphere. Yet each claim, whether
separately or collectively determined, may present the same issues
and require the same evidence from many of the same witnesses.
Practically, under existing codes and rules, solutions are necessarily ad hoc.9
One of the remedies traditionally available when one side in
a particular case is comprised of multiple parties has been the
equitable "class" or "representative" suit, in which one or more
5 Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942);
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great
Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Hess v. Anderson, Clayton &: Co., 20
F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
6 Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938); Davies v.
Gas&: Elec. Co., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949), reversing 79 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1948).
7 Society Millon Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374
(1939); Brenner v. Title Guarantee &: Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937).
8 Bulloch v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956).
9 Cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States,
111 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 493 (1954); Note, 60 YALE L.J.
1417 (1951).
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members of a "class" may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole
group. The class suit remedy as it exists today, however, is so limited that it does not fill the need for representative proceedings
outlined above. Born as a device of convenience to dispose only of a
situation in which a true community or class interest existed, its
original concepts have become categorized and crystalized, so that
the limitations imposed by history and embodied in the present
rules curtail modification of the remedy to serve expanding needs.
The traditional remedy requires that the interested persons comprise a definite group, but that the group be so large that it is
impractical to bring all of its members before the court; more important, a positive showing must be made that the interests of the
parties of record are identical with those of the absentees so that
adequate and effective representation of the latter interests will be
insured. And in this context special procedural problems arise in
pleading, service of process, discovery, amount in controversy, control of litigation, and intervention which take on more than the
usual importance.
The true and hybrid class actions, to be defined later, have
been used in many situations to fill a variety of societal demands:
to protect the civil rights of individuals,10 to test the constitutionality of legislation, 11 to secure the rights of employees in a mechanized society,12 to enable suits by or against an unincorporated
association. 13 By adopting this method of disposing of multi-party
interests, the judiciary avoids multiplicity of actions, saves expense
and time, and obviates relitigation of issues which are common to
all members of the class.
The situations already discussed involving separate but identical rights similarly demand a procedure that is quick, effective,
and competent to dispose of common problems and thus avoid unnecessary litigation. The so-called "spurious" suit, however, has
10 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235
(N.D. Ala. 1955); Comment, Class Action, A Study of Group-Interest Litigation, 1 RACE
REL. L. REP. 991 (1956).
11 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
12 Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
13 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945);
Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921); Brunson,
Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil Procedure, 7 S.C.L.Q.
.!194 (1955); Kalven &: Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U.
CHI. L. R.Ev. 684 (1941); Keeffe, Levy &: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q.
ll27 (1948); Note, 46 Cor..uM. L. REv. 818 (1946); Note, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1954).
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not been expanded to meet modern needs. It has failed to develop
into a remedy which, on the one hand, guarantees every person
his "day in court" and, on the other hand, avoids unnecessary,
repetitive litigation.
The purpose of this article is to discuss numerous aspects of
the class device, to discuss the many procedural problems confronting court and counsel, to determine the effectiveness of one type of
class suit-the spurious-and in the conclusion, to propose legislation for a new rule independent of the rules regarding class
actions, a remedy which would more effectively permit the dispatch of numerous claims arising from similar fact patterns.

I.

PROGRESSION TO THE PRESENT RULES

Developed in equity to circumvent the stringency of joinder
requirements, 14 the class suit doctrine was a necessary development
in its time if justice was to be done. The fundamental rule in
equity was, and is, "that all persons, materially interested in the
subject of the suit, however numerous, ought to be parties: that
there may be a complete Decree between all parties having material interests . . . ." 15
In order to escape somewhat from the limitations of this strict
rule a necessary exception was engrafted,rn so that justice could be
14 See REDESDALE, CHANCERY PLEADINGS 144 (2d ed. 1789); Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515, 26
Eng. Rep. 710 (Ch. 1742).
15 Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 325, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (Ch. 1809)
(Lord Eldon).
16 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 63, at 397 (1947); 1 DANIELLS, CHANCERY PLEADING AND
PRACTICE 190 (6th ed. 1894); STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS 87 (8th ed. 1870);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); see also Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387
Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944). Lord Eldon in Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 325, 33
Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (1809) said: "But that [the principle that all persons materially
interested ought to be made parties], being a general rule, established for the convenient
administration of justice, must not be adhered to in cases, to which consistently with
practical convenience it is incapable of application."
In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940), Mr. Justice Stone said: "The class suit was
an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of
those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties
in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable. Courts are not infrequently
called upon to proceed with causes in which the number of those interested in the litiga•
tion is so great as to make difficult or impossible the joinder of all because some are not
within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts is unknown or where if all were
made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death of some would prevent or
unduly delay a decree. In such cases where the interests of those not joined are of the
same class as the interest of those who are, and where it is considered that the latter
fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all
have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree."
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accomplished in cases where the substance, if not the strict letter,
of res judicata could be satisfied without complete joinder. If the
parties of record had interests identical to those of absent persons
to whom they were consensually related, the parties present might
represent the absentees and assert their interests.
The English developments were summarized in this country
by Story in his Commentaries. 17 After examining the English decisions, Story arranged the principles relative to class actions into
three categories:
"l. [W]here the question is one of a common or general
interest, and one or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the
whole;
"2. [W]here the parties form a voluntary association for
public or private purposes, and those, who sue, or defend,
may fairly be presumed to represent the rights and interests
of the whole;
"3. [W]here the parties are very numerous, and although
they have, or may have separate, distinct interests; yet it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court."18

Story's language was adopted in the codes,19 first in New York,20
and then in other states.21 Decisions interpreting the code provision have applied the principles originally developed in equity and
summarized by Story. Under the codes, class suits have been authorized in several situations: (I) where the interests of the members
of the class are joint,22 or common; 23 (2) where the interests of the
17 STORY, op.
18 Id. at 105.

cit. supra note 16, ch. V.

19 The usual statute provides: \Vhere the question is one of a common or general
interest of many persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very
numerous, and it may be -impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
20 N. Y. Code of 1849, § 119; N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr: § 195.
21 The following states have statutes identical or similar to the code provisions (note
19 supra): ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 55-3-16 (1949); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1947);
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 382; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-105 (1958); FLA. RULES CIV. PROC.
§ 3.6 (1961). GA. CODE ANN. § 37.1002 (1936); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-220 (Burns 1933); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-413 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-319 (1956); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr:
§ 195; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-70 (1953); OHIO REv. CODE § 2307.21 (Baldwin 1958): OKLA.
CODE CIV. PROC. tit. 12, § 233 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. § 13.170 (1961); PA. RULES CIV.
PRoc. rule 2230 (1951); S.C. CODE § 10-205 (1952); S.D. CODE § 33.0410 (1939); WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.08.070 (1956); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 260.12 (1957).
22 Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893).
23 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Penny v. Central Coal &: Coke
Co., 138 Fed. 769 (8th Cir. 1905); Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 477, 51
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members of the class are several, but each is interested in a fund or
property involved in the action; 24 (3) where the interests of the
members of the class are several, but each is interested in the same
relief. 25
A few years before the adoption of the code provision in New
York, Federal Equity Rule 48 had formally authorized class suits
in the federal system,26 although the remedy was well known prior
to the adoption of the formal rule.27 The rule itself caused some
speculation28 because of its language that "the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties." If
this portion of the rule were taken literally, no absent party would
be bound by the suit, and there would be an inconsistency between
the rule and former decisions. If taken literally the efficiency of the
class device would be seriously hampered. But when the class suit
was used subsequent to the rule, that portion was disregarded. 29
In 1912 when Federal Equity Rule 38,30 which followed the code
provision,31 was passed, that portion of rule 48 was omitted.
When the present federal rules were being considered over a
score of years ago, Professor Moore argued that, "A real service
would be rendered the profession if a rule were promulgated
Pac. 841 (1897); Bates v. Houston, 66 Ga. 198 (1880); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179
N.E. 335 (1932).
24 Guffanti v. National Sur. Co., 133 App. Div. 610, 118 N.Y. Supp. 207, afj'd, 196
N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909); Gibson v. American Loan &: Trust Co., 12 N.Y. Supp. 444
(Sup. Ct. 1890).
25 Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 54 Misc. 152, 103 N.Y. Supp. 822 (1907);
Hawarden v. Youghiogheny &: Lehigh Coal Co., Ill Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
26 42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1843). "Where the parties on either side are very numerous,
and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all
brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them
parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all
the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it.
But in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the
absent parties."
27 Mandeville v. Riggs, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 482 (1829); West v. Randall, 29 Fed. Cas. 718,
722 (No. 17424) (C.C.R.I. 1820).
28 1 STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRAcnCE 344 (1909).
29 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
30 226 U.S. appendix 11 (1912).
31 When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the whole. For a history of federal rules 38 and 48,
see 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 23.01, at 661 (1951); Lesar, Class Suits and the
Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. R.Ev. 34 (1937); Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. 874, 928 (1958).

1962]

CLASS Surrs

911

which was really informative." 32 This history of the class device,
the confusion existing in the decisions rendered under the code
provisions, and the uncertainty of the prior federal rules were
influential in the attempt to draft a modern rule. Nevertheless,
in the Preliminary Draft there was not even a separate rule on the
subject until Moore suggested one which substantially conforms to
present rule 23. Moore's proposal relating to the effect of judgment33 was modified, however, because the committee believed
that it was beyond its function to deal with the question of the
effect of judgment since this was a matter of substantive law.34
Rule 23, therefore, emerged in its present form, 35 and has been
subsequently adopted by several states.36

II.

FEATURES OF CLASS SUITS

The unique feature of the class suit is its adjudication of the
interests of absent parties so as to preclude additional litigation.
This is undoubtedly its most worthwhile attribute. Evolving as it
32 Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 571 (1937).
33 Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307, 555 (1937-38).
34 See the comment of the committee in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 'If 23.11, at 3456
(2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
35 Frn. R. CIV. P. 23: "(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them,
one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all,
sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the
class is
" (1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right
refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to
enforce it;
"(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or
may affect specific property involved in the action; or
"(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought. • • •
"(c) DISMISSAL OR CoMPROMISE. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
If the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given
only if the court requires it.''
36 The following states have statutes or rules based on rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: ALA. R. Crv. P. 31 (equity) (1960); ARiz. R. Crv. P. 23 (1956); COLO. R.
CIV. P. 23 (1953); DEL. R. CT. CHAN. 23 (1952); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 23 (1957); IOWA R. CIV.
P. 42 (1951); KY. R. CIV. P. 23 (1953); MINN. R. C1v. P. 23 (1952); Mo. REv. STAT. §
507.070 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE § 93-2704-7 (1962); N.M.R. CIV. P. § 21-1-1(23) (1953);
N.D.R. CIV. P. 23 (1960); TEX. R. CIV. P. 42 (1955); UTAH R. CIV. P. 23 (1953); WYo.
R. CIV. P. 23 (1957).
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did, necessarily the general principles of res judicata have been,
almost without exception, applied to the traditional types of class
actions so that the represented absentees, whether they desire it or
not, whether the action is known to them or not, are bound by the
results of a class adjudication. In the traditional type action (not
the so-called "spurious") that is as it should be and, for proper
judicial administration, as perhaps it must be.
But in order that this overriding principle be applied, other
considerations become incidentally enmeshed in the remedy. The
factors inherent in such suits have been succinctly set forth by the
court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Kainz v. AnheuserBusch, lnc.: 31 "I), the parties must be so numerous as to make
it impractical to bring them all before the court; 2), the plaintiffs
must adequately represent the class; and 3), there must be some
community of interest." 38
The requirement that the members of the class must be so
"numerous" as to make it impractical to bring all the parties before the court has not been a particularly troublesome question.
While no formula has been devised for determining "impracticability," involvement of a large number of individuals naturally
makes it highly impractical because of the difficulties of service and
fluctuations by deaths, etc., to name all the members of the class as
parties. The size of the group has therefore been decisive.39
More troublesome is the requisite that the parties representing
the class must "fairly insure the adequate representation of all." 40
The rules do not and could not set forth all the details that must
be observed to satisfy the requirement of adequate representa194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
Id. at 740. Other articles and decisions which discuss the various requirements of
class suits: Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64 (D. Conn. 1958); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving
Numerous Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 402-18 (1934); Comment, 6 STAN. L. REV. 120,
141 (1953); Comment, II Sw. L.J. 210 (1957).
39 It has been held that it is not impractical to join seven, Jackman v. Union Pac.
R.R., 4 F.R.D. 172 (W.D. Mo. 1944), or eleven, Statler v. Mock, 12 F.R.D. 409 (W.D. Pa.
1952). It has been held not impractical to join forty persons, Atwood v. National Bank,
115 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1940). When the number reaches hundreds, Rank v. Krug, 90 F.
Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Carter v. School Bd., 182 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950) (by implica•
tion), or thousands, Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D., 385 (D. Neb. 1947);
Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944), courts uniformly are satisfied that
joinder is impractical.
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
37

38
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tion. As one decision said, "any attempt to do so would be foredoomed. "41 Courts42 often repeat Professor Moore's formula:
" ... In determining the question the court must consider
(I) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with
the other members of the class; (2) whether his interests are
antagonistic in any way to the interests of those whom he
represents; (3) the proportion of those made parties as compared to the total membership of the class; (4) any other
factors bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for
the rest of the class; and (5) the type of class action involved." 43
One essential ingredient of adequacy of representation is that
the representatives be actual members of the class which they purport to represent. In Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,44 plaintiff
instituted an action for an accounting for surplus funds accumulated under a group insurance policy. His petition alleged that he
brought the action not only for himself, but for the benefit of all
former and present employees of the defendant. The court held
that in this instance the plaintiff could not fairly and adequately
represent the other employees since he had not been an employee
for some time and was not presently insured under the group
policy.
Another ingredient is that the interests of the representatives
must not be antagonistic to those of other members of the class.
The mere fact that there are divergent views among the members
would not, in every instance, preclude the maintenance of the
action. 45 But when the divergence becomes a material consideration, so that the interests of the representatives and the represented
clash, there is not adequate representation. In Kentucky Home
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duling,46 plaintiff sued for himself and for
the members of the Postal Employees Society alleging a breach of
contract of insurance by the change from a uniform premium rate
to a step-rate and praying for cancellation of the policies. The
-u Sheets v. Thomann, 336 S.W.2d 701, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) .
42 Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Matthies v. Seymour Mfg.
Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 76 (D. Conn. 1958).
43 MOORE ,f 23.07, at 3425.
44 30 F. Supp. 173 (S.D. Ill. 1939).
45 Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 152 (8th Cir. 1944). See also,
Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 77 (D. Conn. 1958) and Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q.
191, 194 (1949).
46 190 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1951).
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court denied the use of the class device on the ground that the
requirement of adequacy of representation was not satisfied for
the reason that the members of the society did not, in all probability, have the same interests as the "representative." Some members
might have preferred to continue their policies at whatever rates
might be determined, rather than have their policies canceled and
be forced to "seek insurance in other companies, possibly with less
or different benefits or with higher rates.'' 47
The mere fact that numbers of persons are being dealt with
will probably insure some differences of opinions and desires. Yet,
in the absence of a specific showing of antagonistic interests, either
by inference from the facts or from affirmative evidence, the courts
do not permit this obstacle to preclude the use of the remedy. A
leading decision illustrating the possibility of inferring antagonistic
interests is Hansberry v. Lee.48 The question confronting the
Court was whether certain defendants were bound by a ruling in
previous litigation. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants
from violating a covenant restricting the use of certain land in
Chicago to members of the Caucasian race. The bill alleged that
the covenant was not to become effective unless ninety-five percent
of the owners signed; plaintiffs claimed the necessary percentage
had signed; defendants, however, denied this and contended that
the agreement had never become effective. Plaintiffs then contended that defendants were precluded from raising this issue because of certain prior litigation in which this issue had been stipulated between the parties. The Supreme Court of Illinois49 held
that the defendants were precluded from raising the issue, but the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed on the ground that
such a foreclosure would violate due process. Holding that the
group which sought to enforce the covenant was not of the same
class as those who sought to resist it, the Court said:
"It is one thing to say that some members of a class may
represent other members in a litigation where the sole and
common interest in the litigation, is either to assert a common
right or to challenge an asserted obligation. . . . It is quite
Id. at 802.
311 U.S. 32 (1940), 21 B.U.L. REv. 132 (1941), 26 CORNELL L.Q. 317 (1941), 29 GEO.
L.J. 922 (1941), 39 MICH. L. REv. 829 (1941), 89 U. PA. L. REv. 525 (1941), 27 VA, L. REv.
396 (1941), 26 WASH, U.L.Q. 422 (1941).
49 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939).
47
48
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another to hold that all those who are free alternatively either
to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single class, so
that any group, merely because it is of the class so constituted,
may be deemed adequately to represent any others of the class
in litigating their interests in either alternative. Such a selection of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the same
as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford
that protection to absent parties which due process requires." 50
Representation obviously cannot be adequate in a case where the
representatives attempting to enforce the covenant seek to represent those who desire to resist it.
One further remark may be made concerning the requisites of
the class remedy. Although federal rule 23, as well as decisions construing other rules, requires that "common relief" 51 be sought,
modern decisions have expanded the meaning to the point where
"common relief" means the same kind or type of relief, rather than
the same relief. 52 Both in federal and state courts prior to rule 23type language the representatives and the represented had to seek
the same relief, e.g., an injunction or similar remedy. With the
introduction of the spurious device this stringent meaning has now
been necessarily liberalized. Where, therefore, each member of the
group is entitled to separate relief, such as damages or other
monies, "common relief" is sought.
In order to orient the reader to the manifold procedural problems confronting court and counsel in class actions, a reference
must be made to the various categories of such actions. As is well
known, courts, especially in the federal system, have often characterized class suits as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious." 53 In Shipley
311 U.S. at 44-45.
This requirement is discussed in 3 MooRE ,r 23.10, at 3455; Gordon, The Common
Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REv. 518 (1947);
Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv.
874, 931 (1958).
•
52 Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952); McGrath v. Abo, 186
F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young &: Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944);
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 88 (7th Cir. 1941); State Wholesale Grocers v.
Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D- 510, 512 (N.D. III. 1959). Contra, Farmers Co-op.
Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d IOI (8th Cir. 1942).
53 3 MooRE ,r 23.08, at 3434; Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.
1952); Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
136 F. Supp. 125, 135 (N.D. Ill. 1955); Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C.
Cir. 1948); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
50
51
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Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. 54 a true class action was described as an
action in which a decree will affect the interests of persons too numerous to be made parties; a hybrid as one in which individuals
having separate rights nevertheless have a common interest in a
fund or piece of property; and a spurious as a permissive joinder
device in which the persons have an interest in a common question
of law or fact requiring adjudication. 55 The classification is, therefore, dependent upon the jural relations of the members of the
class, and important results flow from the placing of a class suit in
any one category. Jurisdictional requirements, the binding effect
of a judgment, the running of the statute of limitations, the remedy of intervention-all vary with the "type of suit" deemed to
be involved.
A. True Class Actions

11.

The traditional type of class suit is the "true" class action. It
has been described as "one wherein but for the class device, the
joinder of all interested persons would be essential." 56 Typical
examples are suits by or against joint stock associations, partnerships consisting of many members, or unincorporated associations;57 stockholders' derivative suits58 and taxpayer actions. 59
Cases such as Smith v. Swormstedt60 involving church organizations also fall within this category. 61 In this leading decision, the
Supreme Court overruled an objection asserting that the class
device was not proper where a small number of plaintiffs who
asserted common rather than individual interests sought to repre70 F. Supp. 870 (\V.D. Pa. 1947).
Moore seems to say that in a true class suit the joinder of all interested persons is
essential. 3 MooRE 11 23.08, at 3435. The courts, however, have not seen fit to require this
stringent a test for the true class suit. Compare the language in Pentland v. Dravo Corp.,
152 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945); Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870, 874
(\V.D. Pa. 1947).
56 3 MooRE , 23.08, at 3435.
57 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945);
Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893); Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921). For a comprehensive collection of cases, see
Brunson, Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil Procedure,
7 S.C.L.Q. 394, 396-97 (1955).
58 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 193, at 334 (1946); 3 MOORE 11 23.08, at 3436. See the
distinctions between derivative suits and representative suits in Note, 42 IowA L. REv.
568 (1957).
59 Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REv. 34, 43 (1937).
60 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
61 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Bates v. Houston, 66 Ga. 198
(1880); Hodges v. Nalty, 104 Wis. 464, 80 N.W. 726 (1899).
54

55
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sent some fifteen hundred ministers to enforce rights in a common
fund.
In all these situations the fundamental cause of action or defense that exists for each member of the group is common to all
others; the characters of the rights sought to be enforced or defended are identical, and the few who maintain or defend the
action "stand in the shoes" of the others so that their interests are
clearly affected. In maintaining or defending such a suit, supposedly, vigorous action can be expected not merely for the parties
of record but for all the others as well. Hence, in these situations
the class device performs the important function of disposing of
the dispute involving the essential interests of the members of the
group.
It is not, of course, always possible to place class suits in nice,
neat niches, and many courts properly either ignore the classification of suits or deprecate the use of such odd terms. 62 Because of
the inherent difficulty of classification, the nomenclature is essentially useless. 63 Many decisions, considering other relevant factors
such as the "character of the right sought to be enforced, the jural
relations of the members, the effect of the judgment, the kind of
liability sought to be imposed, the concept of due process, ... and
most importantly, judicial convenience," 64 come to a conclusion
62 Judge Goodrich in Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945), said:
"It may be admitted that the terminology shocks the aesthetic sense and the succession
of adjectives before the noun shows the poverty of imagination in choice of terms characteristic of the legal profession.''
Professor Chafee once remarked: "It is not uncommon, when a case goes through
several courts, for one court to call it spurious and another hybrid, and sometimes the
judges throw up their hands in despair and frankly say they do not know what it is.''
CHAFEE, So~!E PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 249 (1950). The difficulty of classification is shown by
history of Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 108
F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 3II U.S. 282 (1940), opinion on remand, 39 F. Supp. 592
(E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941). The district court denominated the bill "a
class bill"; on appeal, the Third Circuit termed the action "spurious"; the Supreme Court
did not characterize the action; when remanded, the district court said it was "hybrid"
and on appeal to the Third Circuit for the second time, that court said, "Names are not
important.'' 123 F.2d at 983.
63 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 62, at 249: "Therefore, Rule 23 (a) would be greatly
improved, in my opinion, if all the provisions establishing the tripartite division of class
suits were dropped out, making this part of the rule read as follows: '(a) REPRESENTATION.
If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued.' " Such a rule would then be similar
to old Equity Rules 38 and 48 and the code provisions. See also Kalven & Rosenfield,
supra note 13, at 703, 707; Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 13, at 333; Note, 46
CoLUM. L. REv. 818, 823 (1946); Note, 2 How. L.J. 111, ll6 (1956).
6~ Note, 2 How. L.J. Ill, ll6 n.32 (1956).
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without any attempt at classification. In recent civil rights cases
in the federal tribunals, for example, the courts have reached the
conclusion that recognition of civil rights is for the benefit of all
the members of the class, without bothering to denominate the
enforcement suit as one type or another of class action. In Lucy v.
Adams65 an action was instituted by certain Negro ~tudents against
the dean of admissions of the University of Alabama for a declaratory judgment and injunction to obtain admission to that university. In the course of its opinion the court held that the action was
properly brought under federal rule 23(a), without plaintiffs or the
court specifying the particular section and without denominating
the type of class suit. Nor need this have been done. The identical
jural relations of the members of the Negro race, the assertion of
interests of the members of the group to affect the whole group,
the convenience of deciding the question once instead of innumerable times, all were factors which would lead to the application of
the "true" label, but which were considered by the court without
the risk of becoming entangled in the web of explicit classification.
B. Hybrid Class Actions
In the "hybrid" action numerous persons have individual
rights; each has a separate and distinct interest which could be
asserted or defended individually; each would be entitled to separate relief, yet each person has an interest in a specific "common"
fund or property which is to be distributed to all the members of
the class.116 An example is Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co. 67 in
which two holders of trust investment certificates brought an action for the benefit of all holders to establish for the beneficiaries
an equitable lien upon a surplus in a trust fund over and above
the surrender value of the certificates. The court held that juris65 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955) . See the excellent discussion of the civil rights
cases in Comment, Class Actions, A Study of Group-Interest Litigation, 1 RACE REL. L.
REP. 991 (1956) •
66 3 MOORE 1 23.09(2) , at 3439.
67 144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1944). In Boesenberg v. Chicago Title &: Trust Co., 128 F.2d
245 (7th Cir. 1942), action was brought on behalf of all beneficiaries of a trust estate
against the trust company seeking to have restored to the trust estate certain funds
allegedly wrongfully diverted. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but on appeal this
holding was reversed. While the issue before the court was whether the several amounts
could be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of amount in controversy,
the court held that the class suit was properly brought. This type of class suit has also
been recognized under code provisions. Guffanti v. National Sur. Co., 133 App. Div. 610,
118 N.Y. Supp. 207 (1909), afj'd, 196 N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909).
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dictional facts for a proper class suit were alleged on the grounds
that the rights were common to all certificate holders. While the
court did not specify that the action was authorized under federal
rule 23(a)(2), that portion of the rule properly was applicable inasmuch as the rights of the certificate holders were several and each
holder was interested in a common fund-the surplus.68

C.

Spurious69 Class Actions

The term "spurious" was probably adopted from Street's
Federal Equity Practice. 70 Street distinguished between only two
kinds of suits-the "true" and the "spurious." The "true" was one
affecting a fund or property while the "spurious" was concerned
with personal liability. Injunction suits were given by him as
examples. In such cases the rights of the members are several; one
can sue alone; joinder might be permitted; or one could sue for
all, seeking a relief which would abate the injury for all. The object sought, therefore, was common to all. To Street, "spurious"
thus had a more restricted meaning than under present usage.
Under the present-day concept the action envisages two situations: (1) where the interests of the members of the group are
several and each member is entitled to, or is seeking, the same
relief (such as an injunction), and (2) where the interests of the
members of the group are several and each member is seeking
separate but similar relief. 71 Thus the "spurious" action today is a
device to permit numerous parties to band together to dispose of
their multiple interests when they have no affiliation with each
other save the fact that they are fortuitously interested in common
questions of law or fact and they seek or are entitled to the same
general type of relief. Each member of such a group is given a
choice to maintain an action or intervene in one which another
has initiated. In the latter case those persons who begin the action
and all those who intervene then become actual parties and will
gain or lose by any judgment. But absent parties are not affected
See also Henn v. City of Clinton, 131 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1942).
For discussions of this type of suit, see 3 MooRE 11 23.10(3); Comment, 35 CALIF.
L. R.Ev. 443 (1947); Notes, 46 COLOM, L. REv. 818 (1946), 2 How. L.J. 111 (1956), 53 Nw.
U.L. R.Ev. 627 (1958), 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1954).
70 1 STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRAcnCE 342 (1909).
71 Although Fm. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) uses the term "common relief," the courts have
interpreted this to mean the same kind of relief.
<18
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in any way. 72 The spurious suit is therefore merely an invitation to
join and not a "command performance." 73
While the spurious suit has found favor in the federal courts
and some state courts,7'4 there has been a good deal of doubt as to
the real nature and function of the device. Unlike the class suit
it is not based on traditional equitable principles, and historically
this type of suit was never permitted. Many state courts, in construing their code provisions, refuse to go beyond traditional
situations, and do not permit the spurious class action. 75 Decisions
have denied the class remedy in cases involving consumer overcharges, 76 fraud, 77 actions to recover refunds,78 and in other situations.79
Various reasons have been given for the courts' refusal to extend the class device to the area where there is no ready existing
class. Since all the persons who have claims to assert have distinct,
separate interests, one person cannot "stand in the shoes" of an12 Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E.R.R., 7 F.R.D. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1948); 3 MooRE 1f 23.11,
at 3465.
73 3 MOORE 1f 23.10, at 3443.
74 California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947);
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D.
311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
McNichols v. Lennox Furance Co., 7 F.R.D. 40 (N.D.N.Y. 1947); McReynolds v. Louisville Taxicab &: Transfer Co., 5 F.R.D. 61 (W.D. Ky. 1942); Fanucchi v. Coberly-West
Co., 311 P.2d 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 19~7); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d
532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d
472 (1958).
75 Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 190 P.2d 626 (Cal. App.), afj'd,
32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948); City of Lakeland v. Chase Nat'l Co., 159 Fla.
783, 32 So. 2d 833 (1947); Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147
(1944); Kimes v. City of Gary, 224 Ind. 294, 66 N.E.2d 888 (1946); Garfein v. Stiglitz, 260
Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155 (1935); Thorn v. Hormel &: Co., 206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W. 516
(1940); Niehaus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W.2d 180
(1942); Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946), rev'd on other grounds,
25 N.W.2d 908 (Neb. 1947); Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y.
282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939); State ex rel. Gerspacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32, 104
N.E.2d 1 (1952); Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 72 Ohio St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058
(1905); Covert v. Nashville, C. &: St. L.R.R., 208 S.W.2d 1008 (Tenn. 1948); Matthews v.
Landowners Oil Ass'n, 204 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
76 Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938).
77 Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374
(1939); Brenner v. Title Guarantee &: Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937).
78 Thorn v. Hormel &: Co., 206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W. 516 (1940), 24 MINN. L. REv. 703
(1940).
79 E.g., actions by employees to recover overtime compensation, Archer v. Musick,
147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 25 N.W.2d 908 (Neb. 1947);
Neihaus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W.2d 180 (1942);
and actions to recover statutory penalties, Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses
Ass'n, 190 P.2d 626 (Cal. App. 1948), afj'd, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948).
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other in the assertion of his individual claim or defense. It is
argued that one person should never have it in his power to litigate another's interest so that the other would be bound in the
event of an unfavorable determination. To extend the generalization of the worth of the class action in traditional type suits to
the "spurious" class situation would, it is said, violate fundamental notions of due process. Not being before the court personally, and not having himself appointed a representative, the
non-appearing person cannot be bound by any adverse decision.
The federal courts, spurred by Professor Moore's analysis and
treatise, have gone beyond the traditional principles in recognizing spurious class actions,80 although the committee referred to
rule 23 as "a substantial restatement of equity rule 38" 81 and writers referred to the rule as "introducing no change of principle in
respect to class suits." 82 State courts too, construing rule 23-type
language, have sometimes recognized this type of suit.83 In doing
so, the courts have attempted to extend the traditional rules of class
actions to solve a multiple party problem involving the several
rights of individuals where each is entitled to separate relief. Federal rule 23(a) provides:
"If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of
them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when
the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is . . .
"(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought."
so California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947);
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young 8:
Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
81 Original committee 1937 note to rule 23, 3 MooRE f 23.01, at 3404; AnvisORY
COMMITIEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT 58 (1937).
82 CLARK, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES PROCEEDINGS 66 (1938); Sunderland,
The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 16 (1938); Comment, 6 STAN. L. REv. 120,
137 (1953). Professor Sunderland said at 16: "The new rule introduces no change of
principle in respect to class suits, but merely expresses in a simple, intelligible way the
operating principles by which the courts have been guided in dealing with class suits.
What the committee tried to do was to specify in this rule all the types of cases in
which class suits had in fact been authorized, and to state the conditions which the courts
appeared to consider necessary for instituting class suits.''
83 Fanucchi v. Coberly-West Co., 311 P.2d 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Cohon v.
Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958); Salt Lake City v. Utah Lake
Farmers Ass'n, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 P.2d 773 (1955).
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Under the rule the spurious class suit is a remedy which permits certain individuals who claim individual relief to initiate
proceedings for and on behalf of others who are then permitted
to circumvent federal jurisdictional requirements and enter the
pending litigation to assert their individual claims for relief. The
only tie that all the individuals need have is a common question
of law or fact.
In the federal system, most decisions have denominated this
type suit a permissive joinder device, 84 a mere invitation to intervene. Intervention must be made at an early stage and is rarely
permitted after judgment. The orthodox view is expressed in
Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 85 an action brought by certain
cotton growers on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated to recover damages for violation of the antitrust laws.
The court, in denying the plaintiffs' action brought in the class
form, held that the spurious action is nothing more than a permissive joinder device and that counsel's contention that an interlocutory judgment could be entered and then additional parties allowed to come in finds no justification in any principle of law.
Although each party is free to assert and defend all issues relative to the situation as to absentees, any absentee seeking relief
after judgment must instigate a new and independent action and
is thus forced to plead, prove and bear the brunt of the whole
case again; the opposite party, even if he had prevailed before,
must fully defend anew. In short, an adverse judgment does not
foreclose those "represented," however numerous, from litigating
the same issues separately and repetitively. This falls far short of
solving modern-day problems. The spurious class suit under
present federal-rule practice presents something of an enigma. If
the device is merely a permissive joinder remedy which operates
to enlarge the field of federal jurisdiction there would seem to be
no need to be concerned with the requirements laid down in the
rule as to representation and numbers of persons. Furthermore,
if the only function is to avoid effects of federal jurisdictional limitations, what justification can there be for enactment in state rules
of a provision patterned after federal rule 23? It would seem that
84 3 M;ooRE ,I 23.10(3), at 3442; California Apparel Creators v. Weider of Cal., Inc~
162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947); Hunter v. Southern Indem. Underwriters, 47 F. Supp. 242
(E.D. Ky. 1942).
85 20 F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Cal. 1957) •
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the spurious class suit is neither a class suit nor a mere permissive
joinder device. Rather, it is an attempt to provide a remedy to
dispose of a multiple party problem as efficiently as can be done
under present rules.
It has been urged by several courts86 and writers87 that the
action should be interpreted as more than a mere permissive
joinder device-as a new and potentially useful, effective procedure to suit modern conditions. Emphasis placed on the "class"
nature of the proceedings would facilitate a clean disposition of a
whole situation in a single action. Kalven and Rosenfield,88 for
example, have suggested that any decree in the suit should be held
open to permit claimants to participate in the benefits of a favorable decision. Such a suggestion, besides presupposing a decree
favorable to the class side, would still entail the following additional steps: (1) the entry of an interlocutory order by the court,
in favor of the parties plaintiff and those who intervene; (2) a
reference to a master to administer the details; (3) the preparation
and submission of proof of claims and a hearing on any objections
thereto; and (4) the entry of a final decree. 89 This general approach
of allowing intervention after the issues had been closed favorably
on liability was approved recently in State Wholesale Grocers v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.90 Twenty retail grocers and two wholesale grocers in Chicago brought an action against a national grocery
company for injunctive relief and treble damages under the Clayton Act for certain discriminatory practices. Two and one-half
years after the proofs had been closed on the issue of liability the
plaintiffs sought to bring into the action those retail and wholesale grocers who would accept an invitation to join. The court
permitted the plaintiffs to do so and said: "I think the procedures
utilized in the instant cases demonstrate most effectively the proper
employment of the Rules and the tools available to a trial court." 91
This decision is a cogent example of what can be accomplished
so Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942);
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Hunter v. Southern Indem. Underwriters, 47 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky. 1942).
87 Keelfe, Levy 8e Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Note,
46 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 818 (1946).
88 Kalven 8e Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L
R.Ev. 684 (1941).
89 Id. at 693-94.
90 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
91 Id. at 513.
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through the use of the existing rules to ease overburdened dockets.
The class device was invented not only as a matter of necessity
but also as a matter of convenience and utility. This decision
holds that the rules do possess to some extent that "quality of
utility." The original trial tested the legality of the conduct of
the defendant and found against it-conduct which incontestibly
was common in its effects upon all persons injured and the fact
that intervention of the absent persons might take place some time
after trial did not interpose insuperable obstacles.
Other proposals have been advanced to make the rule 23(a)
spurious suit a more effective device by simply foreclosing relitigation of common questions of law or fact by any member of the
class.92 As to these common issues, e.g., an affirmative finding of
the liability of the defendant, there would be one trial which
would be binding upon the defendant which would allow others
to take advantage of the favorable determination and present their
claims in subsequent proceedings. This approach was taken in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer,93 a libel action instituted
against several defendants as representatives of two labor unions.
In the course of the concurring opinion, it was stated:
"I am satisfied that it legally would be possible to adjudicate, on the basis of class representation, whether the publications complained of were in fact union acts; whether they
were libellous in the circumstances; and, if so, what pecuniary damage had been occasioned to appellant by them. . . .
Such an adjudication could probably also be made to serve
as a foreclosure of all questions against the members of the
union as a group, leaving open only the question in favor of
each individual, who might subsequently be sued and served
with summons as a basis for a personal judgment, whether he
had participated in, authorized or ratified such wrongful acts
as the union was found to have committed." 94
From these various viewpoints it can be seen that courts and
writers have not yet reached agreement as to a true and proper
function for the spurious class suit. Nor is agreement likely to be
reached while the spurious suit remains tied in concept to the
Note, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 472, 475 (195J).
168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948).
Id. at 189-90. See discussion in Note, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1954); see also Pascale
v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147, 149 (D. Mass. 1951).
92
93
94
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traditional class suit. Until it is removed from that category,
progress is not likely to be made.
The doctrines of limitations on the class suit are so ingrained
in judicial concepts that no amount of interstitial revision of the
rules would solve the problem of disposing of cases in all the
situations. What is needed is a new legislative rule which will
directly authorize solution of these problems and free the new
remedy from all of the historical limitations of the "class" suit.
Under this new remedy some individuals who have interests must
be permitted to initiate a proceeding for and on behalf of all others
who are similarly situated in order to try, once and for all, the
common issues of fact and law. After the litigation has been
begun, notification could be given to all known, and by publication to all unknown, interested persons to invite them to appear,
join, consent to, or intervene in the pending suit. If the common
issues were adjudicated favorably to the representative side, the
court would have the power to appoint a referee or master to
determine the individual claims of the various persons and the
amount of relief to which each personally might be entitled, if any.
The adversary, before the referee or master, would have the right
to assert any peculiar defense it might have against the individual
claimant, but would not be able to relitigate the common issues
already adjudicated. The claimant would be allowed to present
his claim to the officer appointed or to the court even after judgment. As to those individuals who took advantage of the opportunity to present their claims, a pro rata share of the recovery, if
any, would be allocated to their attorneys' fees and expenses. The
one litigation would then be res judicata to all those claimants
who were original parties or who had intervened or submitted
claims and to the defendants on all the common issues involved.
By this type of procedure eliminating the "class" concepts, it is
believed that the courts would not then be faced with the same
objections that now are faced under the language of the present
rules and equitable principles.

Ill.

SPECIAL PROCEDURAL PBOBLEMS

A. Pleading and Proof
Court and counsel are presented with unique and often perplexing procedural problems in the maintenance of a class action.
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At the outset the pleading must indicate that the suit is a class
action; otherwise it is maintainable only in one's individual capacity.95 The suit is not properly in representative form unless it
, is alleged to be brought on behalf of all others similarly situated.
Such allegation by itself, however, does not determine that the
character of the suit is substantively a representative one.00 The
petition should allege that the class is so large as to make it
impractical to bring all the members before the court,07 but at
the same time it should describe the class with some certainty,
whether the class be plaintiffs or defendants. 98 The complaint
should state facts sufficient to establish the petitioner as representative within the prevailing rules,99 in order to establish prima
facie that the petitioners will fairly and adequately represent the
class.100
The data to be considered relative to adequacy of representation should include "any matter which would prove or reasonably
indicate the lack such an adversary interest on the part of those
named and served." 101 A petition seeking to enjoin the trustees of
a subdivision from enforcing certain restrictions sufficiently satisfied the requirement of adequacy where the petition alleged that
a meeting of the lot owners was held, that a discussion occurred
as to what action the group was to take, that the parties were owners of lots in the subdivision, and that their presence insured the
fair and adequate representation of all the owners.102
,
Of course, where the petition shows on its face an absence of
the elements that must be present the petition will not be upheld.103 The usual form of objection offered to test sufficiency of
95

Spanner v. Brandt, 1 F.R.D. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Reiner, 45 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1942); City of Lakeland
v. Chase Nat'! Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So. 2d 833 (1947).
97 Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1944); RFC
v. Teter, ll7 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1941).
98 City of Lakeland v. Chase Nat'! Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So. 2d 833 (1947); Matthews
v. Landowners Oil Ass'n, 204 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
99 Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344, 254 P .2d 6 (1953).
100 Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young &: Co., 3 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Milton Const. &
Supply Co. v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 308 S.W .2d 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
Although the federal rules authorize "notice pleading" it has been held that in class
suits more facts should be alleged than in ordinary cases. Baim &: Blank, Inc. v. WarrenConnelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
101 Sheets v. Thomann, 336 S.W .2d 701, 7ll (Mo. Ct. App. 1960),
96

102 Ibid.
103 Gray v.

Reuther, 99 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mich. 1951).
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the petition as a class action is the motion to dismiss,104 although
this is not listed as one of the grounds in rule 12 of the federal
rules. But both a motion for judgment on the pleadings105 and a
motion to strike106 also have been used successfully to test the
pleadings.
Not only must the pleadings be sufficient to satisfy the requirements for a class suit, but the proofs likewise must be so. In
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co. 101 a civil action by jobbers of gasoline to
recover damages under the antitrust laws, the court, discussing the
quantum of proof necessary to establish satisfaction of the representative requirements, suggested that this requirement might
have been met if further facts had been adduced. If plaintiffs had
shown that the recoverable damages would have been the same
under all the various contracts, that damages were suffered as a
result of the defendant's price increase, that others in the class
desired this suit (or at least that they knew of few or no instances
where members of the class were opposed to the suit), and that
notice by letter or newspaper could have been given to the represented jobbers,108 then the requirement of representation would
have been satisfied.
Although the procedural rules contain no explicit variations
for the three types of class suits relative to pleading and proof of
the fact of "adequate representation," 109 the standard in the spurious-suit case must in this respect be less stringent and exacting
than in those cases where the group might enjoy some bond of
association or community of interest. By definition in the spurious
suit there will be no persons "similarly situated" in the same sense
as in the other type cases. "Representatives" will not represent
in the same sense, as each interest will be separate, although against
the common adversary. One cannot adequately represent another
104 Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Coxhead v. Winsted Hardware
Mfg. Co., 4 F.R.D. 448 (D. Conn. 1945); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young &: Co., 3 F.R.D.
220 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Hunter v. Southern Indem. Underwriters, 47 F. Supp. 242 (E.D.
Ky. 1942).
105 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945).
106 Saxton v. W. S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
107 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
108 Id. at 94. See also discussion in Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D.
385, 394 (D. Neb. 1947).
109 Fm. R. CIV. P. 23(a) provides: "If persons constituting a class are so numerous
••• such of them ••• as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may ••••"
(Emphasis added.)
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in the assertion or defense of details of his individual claim. A,
injured in a disaster, cannot under traditional standards "adequately represent" B, who may have sustained personal injuries
in the same disaster, as to any issues, and A's action for damages
is not made binding by the rule as to any other injured person
who does not become a party in A's proceeding. All that can be
shown and all that can be required in such suits if they are to
be authorized is that the "reprentatives" are similarly situated because of identity of issues. Recognizing the realities of the situation,
the court in Oppenheimer v. F. ]. Young & Co.U0 placed less stringent requirements of adequacy of representation on the spurious
action because the judgment would not be binding on those who
were "represented."111 Because of these considerations, the meaning of allegations of adequate representation is that there is a basis
for a court finding of the propriety of the representative procedure, under assurance of a fair and adequate presentation of the
common issues in the proceeding.
B. Discovery
In class suits, pre-trial conferences, special interrogatories, and
demands for documents and admissions could be effectively utilized in order both to simplify the issues and to determine the propriety of representation by reference to the number of persons
involved and the differences in views, if any, within the alleged
class. But, as suggested by the materials in the appendix, they
seem not to have been extensively employed. In one case, for
example, general depositions were used to establish the nature of
the defendant's business, but were limited to that issue.112
The pre-trial conference under modern rules 113 has sometimes
been used effectively in large representative suits. 114 Clark v.
United States115 strikingly illustrates what can be accomplished
through pre-trial conferences. In 1948 the Columbia River broke
through an embankment on ground owned by the United States
and flooded the city of Vanport, Oregon, causing widespread dam110 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
111
112

Id. at 390.
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945).

113 FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
114 Clark v. United States, 13 F.R.D. 342 (D. Ore. 1952); Womack v. Consolidated
Timber Co., 43 F. Supp. 625 (D. Ore. 1941). See discussion of the Clark case in Seminar
on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 385 (1959).
115 13 F.R.D. 342 (D. Ore. 1952).
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age. Out of three thousand claims filed against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act twenty cases were selected for
initial trial. Extremely complicated issues of law were involved.
especially as to liability, and multitudes of fact details would require proof, especially as to damages. In pre-trial conferences ordered by the court, attorneys reached agreement on various issues,
resulting in a pre-trial order which occupied sixty-one pages in
the report. The order consisted of first, a statement of facts, second, a statement of the contentions of the parties as to the facts
and law, third, a statement of the issues of fact and law as agreed
upon by the attorneys, and fourth, a list of all the documents
which either party might introduce. Thus the issues were sharply
drawn, much trial time was saved, and undoubtedly the trial was
simplified.
It is in just such cases as this that the remedy proposed herein
would operate. One action instead of three thousand could be
used to determine the liability issues common to all plaintiffs
against the defendant; subsequently, if the defendant was held
liable a master could be appointed to determine outside of court
amounts of individual damages, thus relieving the court of the
undue burden of such details. In fact, in this whole process the
ancillary proceedings could be supervised by special masters appointed for the purpose of taking testimony relative to the individual claims and making initial findings and recommendations
respecting any special defenses asserted by the defendant.11 6 Jury
trial, if demanded, would be held once on the common issues, but
not repetitively for the individual claims. Judgment would determine liability once and for all, thus making unnecessary constant
re-uttering of evidence and parading of witnesses. Parties affected
could be notified and allowed to present their claims before the
master within a reasonable time specified by the court.

C. Service of Process and ]urisdiction 117
When an action is brought against a class, the general principle
is that service of process upon representatives of the class is suffi116 Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 452, 465-69
(1958); Marsh, Pre-Trial Discovery in an Anti-Trust Case, 8 REcoRD OF N.C.B.A. 401 (1953);
Weinstein, Standing Masters To Supervise Discovery, 23 F.R.D. 36 (1959).
·
117 Brunson, Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil Procedure, 7 S.C.L.Q. 394, 411 (1955); Kaplan, Suits Against Unincorporated Associations
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53 MICH. L. REv. 945, 948 (1955).
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dent to give the court in personam jurisdiction over the class. As
has been said elsewhere, "the criterion as to the sufficiency of service in a class suit is whether or not the service of process in question constitutes adequate notice to the class sued to come in and
defend.'' 118
A decision often cited is Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 119 in which the question of the sufficiency of service
on the chairman of a subordinate lodge was raised. The court,
relying on the relationship involved, held that the brotherhood
was given reasonable notice by service on the representative.
More unique questions were presented in White v. Quisenberry.120 Plaintiff sought damages for assault and battery from certain defendants, both individually and as representatives of a local
union, alleging that the assault was committed by the individual
defendants while acting within the scope of their employment for
the union. The defendants moved to dismiss in so far as the
complaint attempted to assert a claim against the union, on the
ground that the union, being an unincorporated association, was
not subject to suit in the state courts. The motion was overruled
and service on the representative individuals was held to be effective service on the members of the union as a class. It would appear, however, that any judgment for damages obtained might
under existing precedents well prove uncollectible from union
funds if the union itself was not a party. Could judgment against
the defendant class bind personally for damages the individual
members represented but not personally served? It has been suggested that no such service could be an effective basis for adjudging personal liability of those represented:
"No one has ever previously believed ... that a federal court
was entitled, on the basis of class representation alone, to
enter a personal judgment of pecuniary liability against an
individual who was in no other manner being brought into
-court. " 121
118 Malamey v. Upholsterers' Union, 7 F.R.D. 403, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See Under•
wood v. Maloney, 14 F.R.D. 222 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Allain v. National R.R. Adjustment Bd.,
120 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
119 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945), cited with approval in Graham v. Brotherhood of
Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
120 14 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1953), 7 OKLA. L. REv. 232 (1954).
121 Judge Johnsen in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.
1948).
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The facts of this case present well the problem of acquiring
jurisdiction in personam over the absent individuals even of a
"true" class in their personal capacity. Although the federal rule
presumably allows service of process on representative defendants
in any type of class suit, it is difficult to believe that service on
representative defendants in a spurious suit could be held effective
to impose a personal judgment for damages upon the absent "represented" persons under traditional notions of due process.
Where defendant service has been held effective in the traditional class suit in the absence of a common name statute,122 suit
has been required to be alleged to be brought against the served
individuals as representatives of the association. 123 Service should
be made upon the person designated by statute,124 if any, and
othen'lise upon such person or persons as will prima facie insure
the adequate representation of the members of the group and
adequately give notice to the class and afford it an opportunity to
defend. If care is taken to serve the process upon persons fairly
representative of the members of the group, service will be effective for some purposes at least. 125

D. Standing To Sue
Questions sometimes arise whether an association has a standing to sue as a real party in interest. If the association itself has
no direct interest in the litigation then it is clear that it cannot
maintain the action, since it is not the real party in interest. In
California Apparel Creators v. Wieder, 126 an unincorporated trade
association and seventy-five of its members sought to enjoin the
defendants from using the name "California" in relation to its
wearing apparel and to recover damages for unfair competition.
The organization, it was held, did not have a standing to sue, since
122 At common law and in the absence of statute the unincorporated association
could not be sued in its common name. Communications ·workers v. Brown, 252 S.W.2d
103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Bloom v. National Fed'n, 35 T.L.R. 50 (Ct. App. 1918); Brunson,
supra note 117.
123 If, however, the unincorporated association is sued to enforce a substantive right
existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States then it may be sued in the
common name under rule 17(b). UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) which
authorized suit against the entity was the subject of some debate in an attempt to limit
the decision to the Sherman Act. See discussion in Kaplan, supra note 117, at 946-48.
124 Various statutes are collected in Brunson, supra note 117, at 416.
125 Canuel v. Oskoian, 23 F.R..D. 307 (D.R . !. 1959).
126 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947).
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it had no direct interest in enjoining such practices. So also in
Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 127
two former employees of the defendant airline and a voluntary
unincorporated labor organization brought an action alleging that
by discharging certain dispatchers defendant had breached a collective bargaining agreement. The court held that the union
would have to be dismissed because it did not seek any relief for
itself.
Where, however, the association has a pecuniary interest in
preventing a diversion of trade from its members, 128 or where a
labor organization itself is seeking recovery for the breach of a
collective bargaining agreement, it has the proper standing to
maintain the action. 129
E. Venue-Federal
In actions based on other than federal rights the general venue
statute is applicable, 130 and accords no special treatment to the
class action. In diversity cases, therefore, the action should be
brought in the district of the named plaintiffs or the district of
the named defendants. The general principle is recognized in
Carolina Gas. Ins. Co. v. Local 612, 131 an action against a local
union and eight individuals who were officers and members of the
local. The defendants were sued "as the representatives of a class
composed of the International Union ... and its members ... as
parties defendant." One of the defendants moved to dismiss the
action against him on the ground of nonresidency, accompanying
the motion with an affidavit attesting to his nonresidence in the
district. The court granted his motion just as it would have had
to in a non-class action, stating, "None of the venue statutes accord
different treatment to a class action than is accorded to non-class
actions. " 132
127 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
120 UAW v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 119 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
130 3 MooRE ,I 23.14, at 3486; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in
the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 933 (1958). 28 U.S.C. § 139l(a) (1958) provides:
"A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except
as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs
or all defendants reside." As to stockholders' actions, see discussion in 3 MOORE ,r 23.21[3],
at 3534-44; Note, 39 VA. L. REv. 512 (1953).
131 136 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
132 Id. at 943.
127
12s
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In actions based on federal rights the proper venue is either
the principal place of business of the association or the place
where the federal right was violated if the association has a regular place of business there. Sperry Prods. v. Association of American Railroads133 involved an action for patent infringement
against an unincorporated association. Under the venue statute,184
which provided that the proper venue was "in the district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which
the defendant ... shall have committed acts of infringement and
have an established place of business," the court held that the association might be sued in either place, as it might in a non-class suit.
F.

Control of Suit

In the absence of a specific rule otherwise, the original parties
who bring the action have absolute control of the suit so that they
may dismiss or settle without permission of the court. 135
"One who brings a suit ... holds and retains absolute
dominion over it unless the court orders otherwise upon findings made after hearing that it is not being prosecuted in
good faith, with vigor and reasonable capacity. There can
be but one master of litigation for the plaintiffs. The original
plaintiffs assumed the burden of prosecuting the cause to a
conclusion and the liability to costs if defeated. It would be
impracticable to permit litigation in these circumstances to
be conducted by the independent action of several plaintiffs
acting without harmony and according to divergent ideas as
to the establishment of the liability of the defendant. This is
the general rule supported by many authorities." 136
Exceptions are carved out of the plaintiff's freedom where a
contrary court order or decree has been entered,137 or where persons have been allowed to intervene.188 The intervenor, however,
132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942), discussed in 3 MooRE 1f 17.25, at 1415.
36 Stat. 1100, § 48 (1911). Today 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1958) applies and provides:
"Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where
the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business."
135 Schatte v. International Alliance, 183 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1950); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 423 (1934); Note, 34
CoLUM. L. REV. 118, 123 (1934); Note, 5 WYO. L.J. 126 (1951); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 587 (1934).
136 Hallett v. Moore, 282 Mass. 380, 388, 185 N.E. 474, 478 (1933).
137 Catron v. Bostic, 123 Va. 355, 96 S.E. 845 (1918).
138 Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron 8: Steel Co., 46 Fed. 336 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1891).
133
134
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cannot introduce foreign, antagonistic or extrinsic issues into the
litigation and must take the case as he finds it.139 A recent federal
decision indicates that these principles are based on orderly procedure in the conduct of litigation. In Schatte v. International Alliance140 action was brought by certain individuals on behalf of
themselves and two thousand others for damages arising out of
loss of employment. One of the twenty-six named plaintiffs had
:filed a petition for rehearing. The other twenty-five, represented
by another attorney, considered it not in their best interests to file
such a petition. The case arose on a motion to substitute another
attorney for the one plaintiff. In denying the motion, the court
relied on the general principle that under orderly procedure the
original party representing others "retains control over the action
as opposed to other members of the class who may later seek to
intervene. " 141
The federal rules, and the state rules based thereon, have now
placed additional restrictions on control of the class suit. Federal
rule 23(c) provides that no action shall be dismissed without court
approval and keys notice thereof to rule 23(a).142 If the action is
a true class action, notice of dismissal or compromise must be
given to the members of the class. In the other types of so-called
class suits notice shall be given only if the court requires it. The
rule, however, applies only to voluntary, not to involuntary, dismissals.143
There can be no doubt that the general principle permitting
control of the litigation by those who initiate action is necessary.
It is usually the only practical choice. But the present restrictions
relative to notice before dismissal now prevent a class suit from
being dismissed without notice to the absentees; such a restriction
is essential and practical where binding effect is intended on absentees. It is doubtful, however, that the same reason for excep1so Hallett v. Moore, 282 Mass. 380, 185 N.E. 474 (1933).

140 183 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1950).
141 Id. at 687.
142 "A class action shall not be

dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is one
defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court
requires it."
143 Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940); Cross v. Oneida
Paper Prods. Co., 117 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1954).
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tion applies to the spurious suit if the action is not a "class" action, in the sense that absentees are not bound, and if the action
is a mere permissive joinder device.
G. Diversity of Citizenship
Questions often arise in class suits in the federal system because
of the diversity of citizenship limitation. The question is whether
the citizenship of each of the members of the class is to be taken
into consideration so that, if some are citizens of the same state
as the adversary, the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtis144 would apply.
If diversity as to all members of the class and the adversary were
required, federal courts would cease to be a forum on grounds
of diversity for many class actions. Accordingly, so far as diversity
is concerned, the absent members of the class are disregarded, and
if diversity exists between named parties, the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied.145
The leading decision applying the general principle is Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble. 146 There the Court, recognizing the impracticability of bringing together many thousands
of persons who resided in many different states, allowed the use
of the class-suit device when there "was the requisite diversity of
citizenship to justify the bringing of a class suit." 147 Where there
is no diversity, however, between the parties of record, the federal
court lacks jurisdiction.148
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
Fitzgerald v. Dillon, 92 F. Supp. 681, 682 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). See also Zelley v. Muehleck, IO F.R.D. 62, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Malarney v. Upholsterers' Union, 7 F.R.D. 403,
405 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Moreschi v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613, 617 (W.D. Pa. 1939); 3 MooRE
1[ 23.13, at !1485; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,
71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 933 (1958). In jurisdictions which forbid class suits against unin•
corporated associations, federal rule 17(b) has been held to be determinative so that
citizenship of all the members of the class determines diversity. In Underwood v. Maloney,
256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1958), the plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania brought action
against the president of an international, a resident of Illinois, seeking injunctive relief
to prevent the enforcement of an order removing him as president of a local. The court
held that it did not have jurisdiction since capacity to be sued is determined by state
law. Since some of the members of the class were citizens of the same state as the
plaintiff, no jurisdiction existed. Such a decision precludes federal jurisdiction but is
sought to be justified in Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 559 (1959).
146 225 U.S. 356 (1920).
141 Id. at 364.
148 Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1947).
144
145
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A mount in Controversy
The amount in controversy, while rarely an issue in state
courts,149 is often determinative of jurisdiction in the federal tribunals.150 Long before the classification of class actions the aggregation problem in class suits was considered.151 The general principle, observed as long ago as 1891 in Clay v. Field, 152 is dependent
upon the separability of interests. If the interests of several persons
are distinct and joined merely for the sake of convenience, the
rights or liabilities "cannot be aggregated together" 153 for the
purpose of giving the court jurisdiction. But if their interests are
undivided, though separable among themselves, the amount of
their joint claim will be the test of jurisdiction. Thus, where the
character of the right sought is one in common among all the
members of the class, the determinative jurisdictional amount is
the total amount sought. In Boesenberg v. Chicago Title and Trust
Co.,154 suit was brought by one person as representative of all beneficiaries of a trust estate against the trustee, seeking to have certain
trust funds, alleged to have been diverted, restored to the trust estate. The court of appeals held that since the action sought sums in
excess of the jurisdictional amount, the subject of the controversy
was not the recovery of the plaintiff's interest (which was less than
the jurisdictional amount) but the "protection, preservation and
administration of a trust estate worth far more than $3,000." 150
In true class actions, therefore, the claims of all members of
the class may be aggregated for the purpose of obtaining the requiH.

149

(1948).

Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514

150 See 3 MooRE ,i 23.13; Note, 39 ILL. L. REv. 178 (1944); 35 VA. L. REv. 510 (1949);
Annots., 141 A.L.R. 569 (1942); 81 L. Ed. 189 (1936).
151 Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits, 15 MINN. L. REv. 501 (1931).
152 138 U.S. 464 (1891).
153 Id. at 480. "While the cited case was concerned with the jurisdictional amount
on appeal to the Supreme Court, the principle applies with full effect to . • • the
trial courts." Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Del. 1949).
154 128 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942).
155 Id. at 246. In Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942) the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the use of that name by the
defendants. Since the plaintiffs had a common cause of action, though separable among
themselves, the amount of the joint claim was held to be the test of jurisdiction. Exam•
pies of "true" suits where the amount involved is the character of the right sought to
be enforced are Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95 (1939);
see Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REv. 34, 47 (1937). In hybrid
class suits it is said that the amounts cannot be aggregated. Note, 39 ILL. L. REv. 178,
179 (1944).
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site jurisdictional amount, while in the hybrid or spurious class
suit, the claims may not be aggregated-each claim must be of the
jurisdictional amount in order for the federal court to take jurisdiction.156 This rule for spurious suits dates back to Pinel v.
Pinel, 151 which forbade aggregation since the demands were "separate and distinct." 158 The rule has been upheld in spurious actions
to recover damages for breach of sales contracts,159 to recover vacation pay of discharged employees,100 to enforce rights under a pension plan,161 to recover damages for fraud, 162 and to recover damages for wrongful discharge. 163 Two decisions arising out of the
termination of the War Damage Corporation are often cited. In
Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 164 a husband and wife sought an
accounting of funds collected as premiums to insure against property damage by enemy action. The interests of the plaintiffs
amounted to only 18 dollars but some 300,000,000 dollars had
been collected from various policy holders, and the question was
which amount involved was properly in controversy. The court
held the interests of the plaintiff and of "represented" persons
were several so that they could not be aggregated to attain the
"jurisdictional threshold." 165 Although in Matlaw Corp. v. War
Damage Corp. 166 the plaintiffs sought to impress a trust upon the
funds, this action fared no better because the rights of the parties
still were several and distinct as to amount in controversy.
156 Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., supra note 154, at 960: "It is well settled that
in a 'true' class action in the federal courts, whether jurisdiction is based upon diversity
of citizenship or upon a federal question arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, the claims of all the members of the class may be aggregated for the
purpose of obtaining the requisite jurisdictional amount. On the other hand, if the
action is either a 'hybrid' class suit under Rule 23(a)(2) or a 'spurious' class suit under
Rule 23(a)(3), then the claims of the several members of the class may not be aggregated
to determine the jurisdictional amount, but rather the claim of each party-plaintiff must
at least equal the requisite jurisdictional amount specified in the statute in order for the
court to have jurisdiction as to him."
157 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
158 Id. at 596.
159 Coxhead v. Winsted Hardware Mfg. Co., 4 F.R.D. 448 (D. Conn. 1945).
160 Long v. Dravo Corp., 6 F.R.D. 226 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
161 Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 199 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1952).
162 Miller v. National City Bank, 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948).
163 Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. California E. Airways, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 521 (N.D.
Cal. 1954).
104 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
165 Id. at 19. It could be argued that this is a hybrid suit since the rights were
several and there is specific property involved, but the court said that it would not
matter that the action might be designated a class action under rule 23(a)(2) or (3).
166 7 F.R.D. 349 (S.D. Ind. 1947).
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These results curtail the efficiency of the spurious suit. To
carry federal rule 23 into effective operation so that the purpose
of the rule would be accomplished, either the rule should be
amended to provide for aggregation in all types of class actions or
the spurious class suit should be omitted from rule 23 and special
provisions be made to govern it. In neither Knowles nor Matlaw
was a decision obtained on the merits. It is submitted that the
result is unsatisfactory, however technically justifiable.

I. Statute of Limitations161
Since in the traditional, as distinguished from the "spurious,"
class suit persons represented are bound by the decision, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all the members of the class at
the time of the commencement of the action. 168 The first judicial
pronouncement to this effect was Richmond v. Irons. 169 There a
bill was filed by a judgment creditor of an insolvent national bank
praying that a receiver be appointed and that the proceeds be
applied to the payment of the plaintiff's debt. A question arose
as to whether relief should be limited to those persons who became
parties prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The
Court refused to exclude any person merely because of late filing,
stating, "if he proves himself to be a creditor with a valid claim
against the bank, he becomes a complainant by relation to the
time of the filing of the bill."170
Justification can be made for tolling the statute of limitations
in the "true" and "hybrid" type suits inasmuch as the absentees
are virtually represented in the action either as to the subject
matter or as to the fund or property involved. But whether the
statute of limitations is tolled upon the commencement of a spu- ·
rious class suit is uncertain. Language in some decisions171 indicates
167 Keeffe, Levy&: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 339 (1948);
Wheaton, supra note 135, at 423; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 942 (1958); Note, 34 CoLUM. L. REv. 118, 127 (1934).
168 3 MooRE ,i 23.12, at 3476.
169 121 U.S. 27 (1887).
110 Id. at 52. The same rule applied not only to creditors: cases collected in Note,
34 CoLUM. L. REv. 118, 130 (1934); but also to stockholders: Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99
N.Y. 185, 1 N.E. 663 (1885); and taxpayers suits: Coyne v. City of Yonkers, 57 Misc. 366,
109 N.Y. Supp. 625 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
171 York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23
F.R.D. 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Judge Frank in the York case at 529 said: "As to suits
under (3), no less than those under (1) or (2), the Rule unequivocally tells all persons
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that one of the uses of this device is the tolling of the statute to
permit other members of the group to intervene after the statute
has run. However, in the recent decision of Athas v. Day 172 this
view was not followed. Action for damages for violations in selling
securities without proper registration was filed by five plaintiffs,
for themselves and all others similarly situated. An amended complaint added three additional parties after the statute of limitations had run. The court held that they could not be added since
the action was a spurious class suit which "involves separate causes
of action, and is a matter of efficiency to avoid multiplicity of actions. Consequently, each plaintiff must be able to avoid the bar
of the statute of limitations without reference to the other causes
of action." 173
This decision is consistent with the present concepts of the
spurious action, although the rules rela1ing to class actions themselves make no such distinction. Of course, this limitation further
curtails the effectiveness of the spurious-type suit. The principle
applied in Athas must be right so long as a person who did not
take advantage of the "invitation to join" the original litigation
would not be foreclosed by it.

J.

Intervention

Intervention is intertwined with the principles of res judicata,
control of the litigation, and jurisdictional requirements; hence
these principles play an important part in the effectiveness of the
class remedy.
Unknown under the organic common law, 174 the device of
having claims of the type therein described that one or more of them may begin such
a class action 'on behalf of all' when the 'class' is 'so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court.' Any non-accepting noteholders, relying on
that assurance, were justified in believing that plaintiff's suit was begun on their behalf
although they were not before the court. To hold that such noteholders cannot, as to
lapse of time, have the benefit, by intervention, of the institution of the suit by plaintiff
would be to convert the Rule into a trap. Since, in a class suit under clause (3), a
judgment will not be res judicata for or against those of the class who do not intervene,
we suggest that if, after trial, the court finds against the defendant, appropriate steps be
taken to notify all such noteholders to intervene ••. judgment to be entered in favor
only of those who do so within a reasonable time.''
172 161 F. Supp 916 (D. Colo. 1958).
173 Id. at 919.
174 2 CHITIY, GENERAL PRACTICE 493-94 (1835). Intervention is the product of the
continental system, and to some extent equity. See discussion in 4 MooRE 1J 24.03.
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intervention was relatively recently adopted in both the- state175
and federal courts.176 Rule 24 of the federal rules governs intervention in the federal courts.177
The proper procedure for intervening is set forth in federal
rule 24(c). The applicant is required to serve upon all the other
parties his petition or motion to intervene, accompanied by a
pleading setting forth the claim or defense upon which intervention is sought. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum
Corp. 118 contains the most explicit discussion of the proper procedure: leave of the court should be obtained to file the petition,179 but:
"The mere filing of the petition pursuant to leave does
not make the petitioner a party to the cause. The original
parties are entitled to be heard on the question of his admission, and, upon filing his petition, he should obtain an order
of notice to them and have the petition set down for a hearing
.... The hearing upon the petition should be followed by
an order denying or granting leave to the petitioner to intervene and become a party . . . . After a petitioner becomes a
party, he stands to all intents and purposes as if he had been
an original party to the suit."180
The federal rules provide for two types of intervention-intervention as of right and permissive intervention. Permissive inter175 CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 65, 420-23 (1947).
Prior equity rule 37, 226 U.S. Appendix 11 (1912), provided: "Anyone claiming
an interest in the litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by inter•
vention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the
propriety of the main proceeding."
177 "(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in the action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a
judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to
the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof.
"(b) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: . • . (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common • . . . In exercising its discretion
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
178 280 Fed. 934 (D. Del. 1922).
179 This is no longer a requirement under rule 24, although some courts require a
notice. Cowan v. Tipton, I F.R.D. 694 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); In re Finger Lakes Land Co.,
29 F. Supp. 50 r,'f.D.N.Y. 1939).
1so 280 Fed. 934, 937 (D. Del. 1922).
176

1962]

CLASS SUITS

941

vention is a matter largely in the discretion of the court. It is
possible only when the applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common; factors of delay,
complication of issues, and prejudice to the original parties may
bear upon the court's exercise of its discretion.181
In the cases of intervention as of right, the discretion on the
part of the court is extremely limited. If the various conditions
set forth in rule 24 are satisfied the court will be bound to permit
intervention. This type of intervention "serves a protective function for the applicant who may be injured unless heard in the
action. Out of fairness to the applicant, considerations of procedural efficiency and of inconvenience to the original parties are
prohibited from influencing the decisions as to intervention of
right." 182 These requirements under rule 24(a), so far as they
pertain to class actions, were judicially stated in Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier:183
"Essential to an absolute right of intervention in accordance with Rule 24(a) is a showing by the applicant for intervention of the existence of both conditions stated by the Rule,
i.e., inadequate representation by existing parties and a judgment that is or may be binding in the action. A showing that
an applicant for intervention will be bound by a judgment
in the action is not in itself sufficient to confer upon such applicant a right to intervene; it must also be shown that representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or
may be inadequate." 184
The above requirement of "inadequacy" of representation
before intervention is allowed under rule 24 does not quite square
with the provisions of rule 23. Under rule 23 adequacy of representation must be shown before the class suit may be maintained.
"If it is a proper class action under rule 23, he is by definition
adequately represented." 185 It is possible however, that the in181 Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141 (1944);
First Congregational Church v. Evangelical & Reformed Church, 21 F.R.D. 325 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Kind v. Markham, 7 F.R.D. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Crosby Steam Gauge & Valve Co.
v. Manning, 51 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D. Mass. 1943).
182 Note, 63 YALE L.J. 408, 409 (1954).
183 220 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1955).
18~ Id. at 248.
185 Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAR.v.
L. REV. 874, 941 (1958).
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tended intervenor may be able to add facts which were not brought
forth originally, and that he may therefore be able to show that
there is inadequacy of representation. Two decisions have discussed the problem. In Bisanz Bros. v. Chicago-M. St. P. & P.
R.R.,186 and Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier,181 it was held
that inadequacy of representation can be established "if there is
proof of collusion between the representative and an opposing
party, if the representative has or represents some interest adverse
to that of the petitioner, or fails because of non-feasance in his
duty of representation." 188 In such instances rule 24 would be
satisfied and intervention presumably allowed.
The second portion of the requirement in rule 24(a)(2), that
the intervenor may be bound by a judgment, has received varied
treatment by the courts.189 A number of decisions have strictly
equated "being bound" with being foreclosed under the doctrine
of res judicata.190 A less stringent interpretation of "being bound,"
however, is shown in the recent decision of Clark v. Sandusky,191
in which certain Negro citizens in Illinois sought damages and an
injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their
right of occupancy in an apartment in Cicero, Illinois. Mrs. DeRose sought to intervene in the action, alleging that she was the
landlord of the apartment house and that she had an interest in
the furniture that was sought to be moved into the apartment.
She sought damages against the plaintiffs and defendants because
her building had been damaged and her furniture destroyed. The
trial court denied her petition for intervention; but the appellate
court, permitting her to intervene as of right, held that while a
judgment would not be res judicata as to her, "she will be . . .
unduly prejudiced by that judgment." 192 Just how Mrs. DeRose
would have been prejudiced, inasmuch as no obstacles prevented
20 F.R.D. 353 (D. Minn. 1957).
220 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1955).
Bisanz Bros. v. Chicago M. St. P. &: Pac. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Minn. 1957).
In Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1944), intervention was allowed because of
inadequate representation.
189 See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 408 (1954).
190 Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961), 50 CALIF. L. REv.
89 (1962) (critical); Sutphen Estates v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951); Durkin v. Pet
Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 374 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Owen v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 41 F. Supp,
557 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
101 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953).
192 Id. at 918.
186
187
188
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her from maintaining an independent action against the parties,
was not explained. If such a liberal interpretation of being bound
is uniformly given, the trial courts may come to be required to
allow the interjection into pending litigation of some issues which
might be more expeditiously and justly handled in separate proceedings.
When an applicant seeks to intervene in the federal courts,
the question arises whether the intervenor must have independent
jurisdictional grounds. The leading decision holding that the
intervenor need not satisfy jurisdictional requirements is Stewart
v. Dunham. 193 A creditors' bill was filed in a state court; after
removal to the federal tribunal, the court permitted certain other
persons to intervene as parties. It was contended that there was
no federal jurisdiction because the controversy did not then appear to be wholly between citizens of different states. The Supreme Court rejected this contention:
"This, of course, could have furnished no objection to removal of the cause from the State court, because at the time
these parties had not been admitted to the cause; and their
introduction afterwards as co-complainants did not oust the
jurisdiction of the court, already lawfully acquired, as between the original parties." 194
In the true and hybrid class suits, intervention will be allowed
even when the applicant does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. In the spurious-type suit, however, Professor Moore's
thesis that "other persons similarly situated [are able] to intervene
without regard to jurisdictional limitations applicable to original
parties," 1915 while approved in a number of cases,196 has not been
consistently followed. 197 Wagner v. Kemper198 did not permit in1oa 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
104 Id. at 64. See also Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921);
Boesenberg v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 128 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942); Developments in
the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 941 (1958).
1915 3 MOORE 1J 23.10, at 3444.
196 Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Zelley v. Muehleck, 10 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R.,
70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
10'1' Wagner v. Kemper, 13 F.R.D. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1952). The court relied on
Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948), where the original parties
did not have the jurisdictional amount. Except for the class device there must be independent grounds of jurisdiction by the intervenor. Hunter v. Southern lndem. Underwriters, 47 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky. 1942).
198 13 F.R.D. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
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tervention by a number of persons in the absence of an independent showing of satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements of diversity and amount. There was sufficient confusion in the rule
to suggest to the Wagner court that, contrary to some other decisions and contrary to the results in true and hybrid class suit cases,
intervention may not be allowed in the spurious-type suit if the
intervenors fail to satisfy these jurisdictional requirements.
While both sections (a) and (b) of federal rule 24 provide that
the filing of the application for intervention must be timely, 190
and while the application usually is made at an early stage of the
proceedings,200 a special effectiveness of the spurious class suit device lies in the fact that intervention can be allowed here even
after a judgment favorable to the class.201 Liberality in permitting
intervention after judgment has been urged202 and was effected in
State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,203 in which
intervention was permitted two and one-half years after proofs
had been closed on the issue of liability. By permitting intervention at such a late stage the greatest utility of the "spurious" device
is achieved to avoid duplicative suits, to dispose of multiple claims
based on identical facts and law which are similar but not identical.
Since this decision is not uniformly followed, however, a rule explicitly providing for intervention at a late stage of the proceeding-or even after judgment-is needed.

Res ] udicata204
While there is a need for a modern effective remedy to dispose
of multi-party litigations, the procedural device of the class suitany class suit-conflicts with the deep-rooted principle of AngloK.

199
200

Distini v. Cunningham, 272 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1959); 4 MooRE ,f 24.13.
Tatem v. Southern Transp. Co., 8 FED. RULES SERV. 24c.32, Case 1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31,

1945).
Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956).
Note, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 632 (1958).
203 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
204 CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 250 (1950); 3 MOORE ,f 23.11; Kalven &: Rosen•
field, The Contemporary Function of the Class $uit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941); Keeffe,
Levy &: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Moore &: Cohn,
Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REv. 555 (1938);
Comment, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1947); Note, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 525, 528 (1949); Note,
34 CoLUM. L. REv. 118, 132-39 (1934); Note, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 818, 824 (1946); Note, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1954); Note, 39 IOWA L. REv. 365 (1954); Note, 13 u. KAN. CITY
L. REv. 163 (1945): Note, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1954); Comment, Denial of Due Process
Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 64, 65 (1946).
:201
202
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American jurisprudence that no one shall be bound by a judgment
without having had an opportunity to litigate his own claim in
his own way.
Nevertheless, because of the obvious need in a representative
suit, a judgment was recognized in some cases as being binding on
those individuals who, although not made actual parties, could be
identified with the suit as "virtual" parties.205 Thus the development of the class suit in equity procedure. Deletion in subsequent
rules of the last sentence of the old Federal Equity Rule 48-"the
decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all
the absent parties"-implied that the drafters, while still recognizing the traditional principles, did consider a representative-suit
judgment binding in the exceptional cases. And despite the absence of any specific rule on the subject, modern decisions have
in similar cases applied the evolved doctrine of res judicata.206
The general principles concerning the binding effect of a
judgment in class actions are simple enough. In a true class action
all the members of the class are bound by the judgment; 207 a
hybrid class action is conclusive as to all members of the class insofar as the fond or property is involved,2°8 and a spurious class action is conclusive only on those who are participating parties or
who somehow intervene in the action.209 Ineptitudes of categorization, however, have led some courts to ignore the classifications
and to decide on the basis of other factors as heretofore suggested.
"The nature of the class, procedural safeguards, and judicial administration in granting relief" 210 have determined that the judgment is binding upon absent persons when it appears from the
record that there are individuals who have an interest in common
205 Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. lbs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Richard·
son v. Kelly, 191 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1945).
206 Professor Moore recommended, in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 571 (1937), that the federal
rules contain a provision keying res judicata to the type of class suit, but the committee rejected the proposal as being a matter of substance. ADVISORY CoMMITIEE ON
RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT 60 (1937).
207 3 MooRE 11 23.11, at 3460-61; Judge Goodrich in Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152
F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W .D. Pa.
1947); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 86, comment b (1942).
208 3 MOORE 11 23.11, at 3468.
209 3 MOORE 1J 23.11, at 3465.
210 Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 874, 936 (1958).
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with those who sue or defend, whose interests are tied by some
bond of association. A judgment is held to be res judicata upon
absent persons in actions involving unincorporated associations,211
in stockholders' suits,212 in taxpayers' actions,213 and in creditors'
bills.214
In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,215 certain citizens,
none of whom resided in Indiana, brought action in the federal
district court of Indiana against the Supreme Tribe, an assurance
society, to enjoin what was claimed to be an unlawful use of trust
funds by the defendant. The suit was brought for the benefit of
all members holding class A certificates (some 70,000) to contest
the Tribe's reclassification of certificates. A final decree was entered dismissing the bill, and later certain Indiana residents filed
suit in the state court of Indiana which would have relitigated the
questions settled by the judgment of the federal court. The Tribe
then sought an injunction against the Indiana residents to restrain
them from prosecuting the action. The United States Supreme
Court held that the Indiana citizens were members of the class;
that their rights were duly represented by those parties before the
federal court, and therefore the previous decree was binding upon
them.
The decision, standing alone, is a strong holding supporting
the rule stated above of the binding effect on a "true class suit"
judgment upon absent but represented members of a true class.
Comparison of Hansberry v. Lee,216 discussed earlier, is clearly
appropriate here. There the question arose as to the effectiveness
of a restrictive covenant which was to become effective when
211 Armstrong v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. 341, 159 Pac. 1176 (1916); People ex rel.
Stearns v. Marr, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431 (1905).
212 Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir. 1916); Kaufmann v. Annuity Realty Co.,
301 Mo. 638, 256 S.W. 792 (1923); Moore &: Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and
Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. R.Ev. 555, 559 (1938); Note, 34 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 118, 136
(1934).
213 Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N.E. 161 (1887); Ashton
v. City of Rochester, 133 N.Y. 187, 30 N.E. 965, 14 N.Y. Supp. 855 (1892); Note, 34 CoLUM,
L. REV. 118, 138 (1934).
214 Towel v. Donnell, 49 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1931); Throckmorton v. Hickman, 279 Fed.
196 (3d Cir. 1922).
215 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
216 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Keeffe, Levy &: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q.
327,337 (1948) say: "It seems unlikely, however, that the Ben Hur case, were it to come up
for the first time today, would reach the same result, for its doctrine as to res judicata
seems irre~~ncilable with the position of the Supreme Court in the case of Hansberry
v. Lee .•••
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"signed by the owners . . of ninety-five per cent of the frontage."217 After one action to enforce the covenant was successful,
subsequent litigation sought to strike down the covenant. The
Supreme Court of Illinois218 held that the first action was a class
suit and that the present parties were bound by that previous
decision, but the United States Supreme Court reversed,219 holding
that due process was violated since the interests of the represented
parties might well be antagonistic--one sub-class of the group
seeking to uphold the covenant, another sub-class wishing to defeat
it. Hence the class suit did not afford "that protection to absent
parties which due process requires." 220 The language used by the
Court suggests that a possible ground for the decision was that no
notice had been given to any member of the class and therefore
the absentees were not bound.221 But the clear sense of the opinion
is that the class, if any, of persons who were earlier represented
and wanted the covenant enforced did not include those who
might elect to reject the covenant.222 The rule to be found in Hansberry is not that all persons represented in a class suit must agree
with the purposes of the acting plaintiff in order for them to be
bound by the judgment, nor is it that due process cannot exist for
purposes of applying res judicata unless all represented persons
are members of some lodge or comparable voluntary association.
The rule is simply and clearly, as stated, that there exists no class
for such purposes "where it cannot be said that the procedure
adopted fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it."
Cases223 subsequent to Hansberry have continued to apply the
doctrine of res judicata in class suits, recognizing the fact that
Hansberry has not eliminated this principle in such actions.
217
21s
210

Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519, 524 (1934).
372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939).
311 U.S. 32 (1940).
220 Id. at 45.
221 Id. at 42.
222 Comment, 25 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 64, 74 (1946); see also Note, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1059,
1062 (1954); Note, 49 YALE L.J. 1125, 1127 (1940).
223 Waybright v. Columbia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1941); International Allied Printing Trades Ass'n v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J.
1940). The language of Judge Goodrich in Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852
(3d Cir. 1945) is: "The learned district judge was in error when he said, in his opinion
in this case it was 'too astonishing to be accepted' that one unwilling to appear in a
suit might be bound by the judgment therein. That is just what does happen in case of
a true class action."
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In the case of the spurious class suit, whether the members of
the class are entitled to the same or to separate relief, courts have
held that a previous adjudication is not binding upon the absent
parties.224 Here, it is said, the judgment binds only those persons
who are before the court, including those who intervene and were
made parties.225 Various proposals have been made to apply the
doctrine of res judicata to the spurious class action. Keeffe, Levy,
and Donovan226 suggest that, since the Supreme Court in Hansberry did not foreclose the possibility that res judicata would apply
to a spurious class suit,221 notice should be given to the members
of the class to provide them with an opportunity to participate in
the litigation or be bound by the decision. And one writer2 28 argues
that due process would be satisfied if timely notice were given and
an opportunity to participate provided.229 Another view suggests
that only the common issues be held to be res judicata.230
Possibility of non-legislative extension, however, was rejected
in the recent federal district court case of Pennsylvania R.R. v.
United States. 231 Ammunition stored at Perth Amboy exploded,
causing widespread damage to persons and property, resulting in
the filing of over 30 death actions, 110 injury actions and 8,000
suits for property damage. Pennsylvania Railroad, one of the possible tort-feasors, brought a "spurious type" class action against
representative claimants for a declaratory judgment to determine
its legal responsibility, and it urged the court to apply the principle of res judicata to all known and unknown claimants. The court
rejected this proposal and refused to permit its decision to be
binding on any claimant who had not become a party. The court
recognized the difficulties inherent in disposing of this mass of
claims but concluded:
224 Schatte v. International Alliance, 183 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1950); Pentland v. Dravo
Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young&: Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390
(2d Cir. 1944) (dictum); Albrecht v. Bauman, 130 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Hurd v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1955); Walton v. Poplos, 32 Del. Ch. 292,
85 A.2d 75 (1951).
225 York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
226 Keeffe, Levy&: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 342 (1948).
221 Hansberry v. Lee, 3ll U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
228 Note, 46 Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 818, 833 (1946).
229 See the proposals summarized in Note, 7 OKLA. L. R.Ev. 472 (1954), and the dis•
cussion concerning notice in Note, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1059, 1062-65 (1954).
230 Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 189·90 (8th Cir. 1948); Pascale
v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147 (D. Mass. 1951); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 90, 95 (1940).
231 Ill F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953), discussed in Note, 63 YALE L.J. 493, 5ll (1954).
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"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and existing legislation do not provide a satisfactory solution of the problems
presented by the legal controversies arising out of accidents
such as the South Amboy explosion. They are controversies
in which the common questions of law and fact should be
tried in one action in which every individual and corporation
accused of liability and the United States could be joined,
in which all claimants could be represented and in which all
the evidence could be presented. Such a result, however, cannot be achieved unless Congress modifies, in this unusual type
of situaton, the requirements of complete diversity of citizenship, allows service of summons outside of the district wherein
the court hearing the case sits, and permits a federal court to
enjoin all other suits arising out of the same occurrence."232
It seems hard indeed to foreclose anyone's personal claim without permitting him to present his own facts by an attorney of his
choice, with the chance to exercise for himself the available trial
strategies. Would such a foreclosure be buying judicial efficiency
at too high a price? Would new legislation attempting this for the
sake of expediting multiple-claim situations violate inviolable
principles? The Supreme Court of the United States, in Hansberry
v. Lee, strongly hints that it would not-if there can be insured a
"protection of the interests of absent parties" and a "full and fair
consideration of the common issues." 233 Accordingly, in the conclusion of this paper it will be urged that model or uniform legislation be adopted along these lines.
Even under the present procedures, the common opponent
who has lost in the representative action may be prevented from
relitigating issues common to the claimants in each separate new
proceeding. It has been suggested234 that the common issues would
once and for all be foreclosed, so that the defendant would not be
permitted to continue to relitigate the question. "There seems to
be no good reason why the defendant should be permitted continual relitigation of a factual problem already judicially determined."235 A technical justification for the defendant to relitigate
common issues is the fact that the defendant may be entitled to a
jury trial. But in an analogous situation-a case involving permis232
233
234
235

Ill F. Supp. at 91.
llll U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
Note, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472, 474 (1954).
Note, Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Act, 50 YALE L.J. 90, 95 (1940).
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sive joinder of plaintiffs-Akely v. Kinnicut,23G in which the defendants contended that they should be entitled to a jury trial as
to each plaintiff, the court rejected the contention and held that
the defendants did not have a right to a separate trial by jury on
each claim. As long as the "substance of the right of trial by jury is
preserved," the right is not violated.237
L. Attorneys' F ees238
It has been traditional in true, 239 hybrid, 240 and spurious241
type suits to award a reasonable attorneys' fee reimbursement to a
party who has by his expense and effort in a representative suit
created or captured the fund or property in which others may
share.242 The basic principles are that represented persons who are
entitled to share benefits should also share the expenses,243 and that
"property which has been secured by the services of an attorney
should bear the cost thereof." 244 These principles are implicit in
the theory that "the plaintiff is the representative of the whole class
238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682 (1924).
Id. at 475, 144 N.E. at 685.
See the excellent article by Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor
in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REv. 658 (1956). His other writings dealing with
stockholders' suits are: Note, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLUM.
L. REY. 784 (1939); New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLUM. L. REY. 1
(1947).
239 Harris v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 197 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1952); Confederated Bands of
Ute Indians v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 609 (1951).
240 Nolte v. Hudson Nav. Co., 47 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1931); Central Trust Co. v. United
States Light &: Heating Co., 233 Fed. 420 (2d Cir. 1916); Helm v. Smith-Fee Co., 79 Minn.
297, 299, 82 N.W. 639, 640 (1900); White v. University Land Co., 49 Mo. App. 450 (1892).
241 Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 66 (7th Cir. 1939); Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
242 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'! Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Hobbs v. McLean, 117
U.S. 567 (1886); Central R.R. &: Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Fitch, 354 Mo. 638, 190
S.W.2d 215 (1945); Aetna Ins. Co. v. O'Malley, 124 S.W.2d 1164 (Mo. 1938) (award
governed by legislative appropriation); White v. University Land Co., 49 Mo. App. 450
(1892). See Annots., 49 A.L.R. 1149 (1927); 107 A.L.R. 749 (1937). The principle had its
origin in the English courts of chancery-see historical discussion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, supra at 164.
243 "The rule is established that where one goes into a coun of equity and takes
the risks of litigation upon himself, and successfully creates, protects, or preserves the
fund, to share in which others are entitled, those others will not be allowed to lie back
and share the results of the successful labors, without contributing their due share. And
a court of equity ••• requires payment out of the fund before distribution, of reasonable
costs and expenses, including reasonable counsel fees of the complainant whose diligence
has created or preserved the fund •.••" Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1149, 1153 (1927).
244 Hornstein, supra note 238, 69 HARv. L. REv. 658 (1956). See also Note, 33 No'IRE
DAME LAw. 651 (1958).
236
237
238
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and is authorized to contract for all with respect to the expenses of
the litigation," and in the fairness theory of quasi-contract.245 In
one of the leading decisions, Trustees v. Greenough,246 a holder of
railroad bonds sued on behalf of himself and other bondholders
to set aside certain conveyances and to appoint a receiver to care
for the property which was being sold at nominal prices. The litigation on behalf of the plaintiff was successful, the fund was saved,
and a considerable amount of money was realized for all the holders of the bonds. The plaintiff bore the burden of the litigation,
advanced money for expenses, and employed attorneys to realize
this result. A question arose as to allowance of expenses and attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court of the United States allowed the
attorney fees and expenses, stating:
"[I]n a case like the present, where the bill was filed not only
in behalf of the complainant himself, but in behalf of the
other bondholders having an equal interest in the fund; ...
and done at great expense and trouble on the part of the complainant; and the other bondholdrs have come in and participated in the benefits resulting from his proceedings, . . . he
may be said to have saved the fund for the cestuis que
trust . ... It would be very hard on him to turn him away
without any allowance except the paltry sum which could be
taxed under the fee-bill. It would not only be unjust to him,
but it would give to the other parties entitled to participate in
the benefits of the fund an unfair advantage." 247
That attorneys' fees are awarded in spurious suits can be seen from
the case of Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,248 in which attorneys
applied for an additional allowance of fees after they were successful in recovering retroactive compensation due to certain life insurance agents employed by the insurance company. The court
awarded an additional fee of 225,000 dollars for services rendered,
taking into consideration the novel and complicated problems involved in the litigation. It is apparent also that when the attorneys
representing the initial parties are successful in the spurious suit,
so that others may intervene to assert their demands, the original
attorneys should be entitled to a proportion of the recovery of the
245
246
247
248

Note, 33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 651, 652 (1958).
105 U.S. 527 (1881).
Id. at 532.
94 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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intervenors. Otherwise grave inequities could result. Absentees
could await the outcome of the initial litigation, and then through
their own attorneys take advantage of a judgment without being
responsible to the successful attorneys whose efforts aided in creating the interests for the absentees. 249
To entitle attorneys to a fee collectible in part from persons
merely "represented," i.e., from the members of a spurious class,
the efforts compensated must have resulted in the creation or increase of a fund in which such represented persons may share.250
When that is established the court in its sound discretion251 will
take into consideration in determining the amount of fees: the
nature, character and extent of the service rendered; the time
devoted to the matter by the attorneys; the professional standing of
the attorneys and their degrees of professional skill and experience;
the value of the fund; and the favorable result and benefits obtained.
Although some special difficulties in determining the proper
and fair amount of attorneys' fees should be expected to be encountered in the spurious type suit, that suit should not therefore
be treated differently in this respect from other types. The theory
of the spurious suit device-that the rights are separate, that each
person would be entitled to seek separate relief-would seem consistent with requiring that no represented person may gain unless
he submit to bear his own proportion of fees. One barrier may be
canon 28 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. That provides: "It
is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit.... It is disreputable to ... breed litigation by seeking out
those having claims for personal injuries or those having any other
ground of action in order to secure them as clients ...." However,
it has been suggested that in such wide-ranging affairs as representative suits the attorney should be allowed reasonable latitude in
soliciting intervenors as long as this is done under the auspices
of the court.252 If the spurious suit is to be successful some reason249 Note, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 627, 636 (1958). See also Comment, Suit by Class Representation in Ohio, 20 U. CINC. L. R.Ev. 85, 114 (1951).
250 Thomas v. Peyser, 118 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Matter of Attorney Gen. v. North
Am. Life Ins. Co., 91 N.Y. 57 (1883); Note, 33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 651, 652 (1958). Even
where the litigation has become moot, it has been held that attorneys are entitled to a
fee, Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
251 Central Trust Co. v. United States Light & Heating Co., 233 Fed. 420 (2d Cir. 1916).
252 Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in
Illinois, 42 ILL. L. R.Ev. 518, 532 (1947).
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able notification should be permitted, and if this is supervised by
the court there should be no violation of the canon.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

It has been shown that there are two kinds of situations wherein
under existing rules the representative suit remedy is readily and
consistently made available for single-litigation disposal of multiple-party claims: first, where numerous absent parties and those
representing them are already tied together in some consensual
or status relationship constituting a "true class" under traditional
equity standards; and second where the relief sought is the validation or division of some specific collectively-claimed fund or asset
subject to the court's jurisdiction. In these situations, by and large,
the results show that the remedy functions well-although problems of pleadings, evidence, and internal procedures in the suit
generally are complicated by the exigencies of the due representation of absent parties, foreclosing their rights.
But it is seen also that there is a further area of potential usefulness of the representative suit in which the present rules have
not served at all well-that is, where there has existed neither a
"true class" nor a community of claim to a specific common relief
or common fund. The hard question is whether in this increasingly
important area the representative suit can and ought to be made
functional; and it has been said in many cases that the doctrine of
res judicata cannot constitutionally and fairly be applied to bar
the rights of absent "represented" persons.
The Supreme Court of the United States broadly hints otherwise, however, in its opinion in Hansberry v. Lee,253 saying:
"There is scope within the framework of the Constitution
for holding in appropriate cases that a judgment rendered in
a class suit is res judicata as to members of the class who are
not formal parties to the suit. Here, as elsewhere, the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel state courts or legislatures to adopt any particular rule for establishing the conclusiveness of judgments in class suits; ... nor does it compel the
adoption of the particular rules thought by this Court to be
appropriate for the federal courts. With a proper regard for
divergent local institutions and interests, . . . this Court is
253

311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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justified in saying that there has been a failure of due process
only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure
adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent
parties who are to be bound by it." 254
It is the conception of the recommendations herein that a procedure "fairly insuring the protection of the interests of absent
parties" can be effected by legislation imposing upon the court
directly the duty of judicially determining and finding as a condition of final judgment (a) that there has existed throughout all the
proceedings an adequate and diligent representation and protection of the rights of absent represented persons, and (b) that the
judgment is intended to be binding upon those persons. That a
judgment may be binding upon those persons who are not parties
of record in the so-called "spurious type" class suit, when an adequate procedure for notification is adopted, finds favor in the
language of the Supreme Court in Hansberry:
"Nor do we find it necessary for the decision of this case to
say that, when the only circumstance defining the class is that
the determination of the rights of its members turns upon a
single issue of fact or law, a state• could not constitutionally
adopt a procedure whereby some of the members of the class
could stand in judgment for all, provided that the procedure
were so devised and applied as to insure that those present are
of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so
conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the
common issue" 255
If adequate personal notice were given to known absent claimants ensuring assertion of their claims within the time specified by
the court, the procedure thereby adopted would, in view of recent
developments in the field of acquisition of in personam jurisdiction, seem to be consistent with due process. State barriers have
ceased to place limitations upon the courts in any particular forum;
the trend in the past decade or two has been to expand the permissible scope of jurisdiction. Keeffe, Levy, and Donovan256 have
argued that it is a proper problem of public concern to adjudicate
254 Id. at 42. It is submitted arguendo that in the context of this quotation, as elsewhere, and in federal rule 23, the Court uses the terms "class" and "class suit" to include
the so-called "spurious" class suit.
255 Id. at 43.
256 Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 347 (1948).
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issues as to all members of the class without multiple actions, and
that the issues in common should be foreclosed as to all members of
the class. Since the publication of the Keeffe article, judicial recognition of the transformation of our national economy has made fair
and reasonable notice, rather than territorial power, the important
consideration.257 It would now seem to be a logical step in the
progression to provide a procedure whereby the absentees, upon
adequate notice, would be foreclosed from re-trying their individual claims.
Under such a rule or statute there could be one determination
made which would dispose of all the numerous claims of the members of a group dependent upon the same fact pattern. If the decision were favorable to the group, absentee members would be able
to assert their claims and have them determined by supplementary
proceedings. If, on the other hand, the decision were adverse to
the group, res judicata would be applicable only to all members
personally notified. If personal notification had been given to all
members of the class, they would thus all be foreclosed from relitigating. This procedure, under the language of Hansberry, should
not be unconstitutional. And such a procedure, foreclosing the
interests of members of the group when the defendant is successful,
would not only assure the defendant that he would not be burdened with innumerable additional litigations after using every
effort to defend the initial suit, but would achieve judicial efficiency in disposing of numerous claims in one action.
It must be admitted that persons who neither appeared nor
were personally served could not be foreclosed, and could maintain
their separate actions. The difficulty in making the issues res
judicata as to all members of the group (notified or not) when the
decision is favorable to the defendant is that it is hard to propose
that individual rights should be foreclosed without notice in an
action brought by a total stranger, whose only relationship would
be the fortuitous circumstance giving rise to common questions of
law and fact. Nevertheless, these multiple-party similar-fact situations cry for a procedure that will dispose of the multiple claims
fairly as to all concerned. The proposal herein, it is submitted,
balances these conflicting values and is consonant with due process.
257 Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Nelson v. Miller, 11 III. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673
(1957).
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Although the issues could still in some instances be re-tried by
unnotifi.ed "represented" persons, this difficulty may be more apparent than real. In many instances, all the members of the group
would be known and personal notice could be achieved. Publication could be made, inviting unknown members of the group to
participate and assert their claims. If any should do so their interests would, of course, be foreclosed in the event of a decision favorable to the defendant. Furthermore, if the defendant is successful,
the individual claims may be such as not to justify separate actions
upon issues once lost. And the defendant would be, under the suggested statute, safe at least against the claims of those members
who had been served with adequate notice in the first action. The
alternative-to foreclose the rights of persons who neither appeared nor had been accorded opportunity to appear-would be
undesirable, even if to do so, for the sake of judicial and public
convenience, might be constitutional under the broad implications
of Hansberry.
The difficulties presented by use of the representative suit are
varied and complex. Traditional conservatism, unfortunate and
artificial classifications, failure of existing rules to provide explicit guidance in certain instances-all these combine to make the
device something less than the modern, effective judicial remedy
it could become. If this device is ever to fulfill its potential in modern procedure, the wording of the rules and statutes relating to
representative actions should be improved to state the intention
to cover the situation where there are numerous parties and their
claims have only questions of law or fact in common. This approach would make it possible to divorce the historical principles
evolved in "class" actions, with their technicalities and limitations,
from the modern remedy. In this new device, where the questions
of fact or law are common to numerous persons, the common issues258 relating to liability appropriately may be tried first, and if
those be adjudicated favorably to the represented group then other
persons, after notification, can be permitted to present their claims
before a master or trustee appointed by the court. Thus, the common issues will be litigated only once, and the individual issues
will be determined by an officer so that the court will not be bur258 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 189-90 (8th Cir. 1948); Pascale
v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147, 149 (D.C. Mass. 1951).
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dened with time-consuming testimony on individual claims. Those
persons who do not appear to present their claims or who are not
parties of record will have to be bound, subject to appeal, under
the principles of res judicata if the court has obtained jurisdiction
over them by adequate notification; they will be free to litigate
their own claims if it has not. Notice can be given to permit individual claimants to present their demands, even after judgment,
and such notice should, subject to sufficiency of the grounds for
representative suit procedure, be made binding upon those who do
not present their claims.269 Liberal intervention should be allowed
to permit the claimants to present their claims even after judgment.260 Those persons who would have a tendency to lie back and
await a favorable verdict would, of course, be responsible for their
proportionate share of costs and attorneys' fees in accordance with
the traditional principles concerning attorneys' fees in class actions.
It is proposed, therefore, that federal rule 23(a)(3) and the state
rules based thereon be repealed, and the rules amended to provide
for a new rule along the following lines:
If there are numerous persons having separate rights and
it is or may be impracticable for each of them to maintain
suit individually, and there is a common question of law or
fact affecting the several rights of the parties, and a common
relief is sought, one or more of such persons may maintain
action for himself and all others similarly situated. Aggregation of the amounts in controvery shall be allowed.
Intervention may be permitted by the court at any time,
even after judgment, without regard to diversity of citizenship or amount261 so as to permit a claimant to present and
prove his claim. The court shall have the power to appoint a
master or other officer or officers to hear and determine the
claims, and such officers may take such evidence and proof as
are deemed to be necessary. Evidence with regard to personal
defenses which may bar the right of the individual claimant
to recover may be taken. Personal or other adequate notice
shall be given to known potential claimants as directed by the
court to provide opportunity to present their claims.

259

Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 256; Note, 46 CoLuM. L. REv. 818, 833 (1946).
Two and one-half years had elapsed since proofs had been closed on issue of
liability in State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D.
Ill. 1959).
261 This part of the rule would be omitted in the state rules.
260
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Matters of fact and law in common shall be conclusive
upon the defendants and upon those claimants who within the
time authorized by the court present and prove their claims.
And if there be a finding upon sufficient record and evidence
that all the rights of persons represented who did not appear
were adequately and fairly represented as to the common issues of law and fact, all persons who were personally or otherwise adequately notified262 and who did not appear to present
their claims within the time authorized by the court shall be
foreclosed from further litigating their claims. Persons not so
notified, however, shall not be foreclosed.
If such a rule or model statute were adopted, many controversies in the state courts which involve numerous parties would be
decided and disposed of instead of being dismissed as is presently
the case under the code provisions. Under the present state rules,
the result is that either the claimants have no effective remedy because of the time and expense in seeking recovery for small sums,
or that the courts are needlessly over-burdened because each person must maintain a separate action.
262 Notice, "reasonably calculated •.• to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections," under somewhat analogous state legislation was passed upon by the United States Supreme Court in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank b Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Legislation
adopted in New York empowered trust companies to establish common trust funds and
invest as one mingled fund the assets of small estates. Notification to beneficiaries for the
judicial settlement of the trustee's account was to be by publication-"a notice or
citation addressed generally without naming [the beneficiaries]." Central Hanover Bank,
following the legislative directive, petitioned for settlement and informed the beneficiaries
as prescribed by law. Mullane, who had been appointed special guardian for the beneficiaries, objected to the form of notice. Unsuccessful in the state courts, Mullane appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States. That Court held that the notice by publication required by the banking law of New York was incompatible with the fourteenth
amendment when it sought to foreclose the personal rights of known beneficiaries. A
clear implication of the decision is that if due and adequate notification had been given
to those known beneficiaries, due process requirements would then have been satisfied.
Such implication accords with the hypothesis submitted in the text that upon adequate
notification to those known absentee members of a class, foreclosure of personal rights
should not offend due process. And, analogously, if the judicial settlement had been
undertaken by employing the representative-suit technique, similar adequate notice to
absent "represented" beneficiaries likewise should satisfy requirements of due process.
The decision and its possible broad implications are discussed in Perry, The Mullane
Doctrine-A Reappraisal of Statutory Notice Requirements, CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE
LEGISLATION 33 (University of Mich. Legislative Research Center 1952); Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 305 (1951); Note,
50 MicH. L. R.Ev. 124 (1951).
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And in the federal courts such a rule would expand the concept
of the spurious suit from a mere permissive joinder device to one
which permits disposition of the numerous claims of many persons.
By allowing absentees to intervene after judgment if their side is
successful on the common issues and have their claims determined
by an officer of the court without the necessity of proving again
the facts and law common to the members of the group, and foreclosing those who have been adequately notified but have not intervened, an efficient judicial remedy would be provided. While ·
some decisions in the federal system recognize the utility of the
spurious action, uniform treatment has not been achieved, nor will
it be as long as the "class suit" doctrines govern the remedy for the
disposition of such group interests. The above proposal would retain the elements of judicial procedure and at the same time adequately permit disposition of complex problems which today confront the courts and tomorrow may create chaos.
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APPENDIX

Field Study
In an effort to determine the practical procedural problems confronting
court and counsel in class suits and to assess the effectiveness of the spurious
suit in particular, a field study was undertaken. Eighteen cases considered
to be fairly typical were chosen for examination.1 Various types of cases
were selected: actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, cases involving
price discriminations, suits by creditors to set aside fraudulent transfers,
libel suits, and others. An inquiry was addressed to both trial counsel2 and
trial judges. 3 Numerous questions were asked and comments were invited.
Among the questions asked were the following:
1 Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952); Pentland v. Dravo Corp.,
152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young &: Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1944); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At!. &: Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. III.
1959); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Canuel v. Oskoian, 23 F.R.D. 307 (D.R.I. 1959); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D.
311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Zelley v. Muehleck, 10 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Rosenberg v.
Globe Aircraft Co., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E. R.R.,
70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Schempf v. Armour &: Co., 5 F.R.D. 294 (D. Minn.
1946); Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio 1943); McReynolds v.
Louisville Taxicab &: Transfer Co., 5 F.R.D. 61 (W.D. Ky. 1942); Heffernan v. Bennett
&: Armour Co., 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. App. 1952); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 III.
2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 III. App. 2d 21, 149
N.E.2d 472 (1958); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 III. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951); Locke
v. City of Detroit, 335 Mich. 29, 55 N.W.2d 161 (1952); Salt Lake City v. Utah Lake
Farmers Ass'n, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 P.2d 773 (1955).
2 Inquiry usually by letter: "In the case of . . . which involved a 'class suit' under
modem rules of civil procedure, your firm represented one of the litigants in the
cause. The reported decision indicates that the class suit was proper under the circumstances.
"Inasmuch as I am doing research on Procedural Problems of Class Suits . • • I
would appreciate your help in determining the events that occurred after the reported
decision. I am particularly interested in those procedural and trial problems that
confronted you after the appellate court determined that the class action was proper,
and the solution of those problems. I would also appreciate your comments concerning
the aftermath of the reported decision in order that a comparison can be made with
the numerous other cases throughout the country so that a single article will condense
the various problems for the guidance of other attorneys who may be faced with
similar cases.
"In particular, I am interested in obtaining information as to the procedural methods
used in proving the claim of each member of the class and of disposing of the funds of
the class.
"I have prepared a questionnaire which I enclose to give you some indication of
the scope of the problems as I see them. I am sure, however, that other matters will
come to your mind, and I welcome any comments you may have."
3 Inquiry usually in letter form: "In the past several years there have been a great
number of reported decisions dealing with class suits. The courts, I feel, are struggling
to find some uniformly effecting method to dispose of multiparty claims when the
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What specific allegations did the petition contain to satisfy the requirement of adequacy of representation?
How many members of the class were there? v\7hat were the considerations in choosing the ones to represent the class?
What benefits did you consider appropriate that prompted the class
device?
Was any notification given to the members of the class before or after
the filing of the suit to the effect that suit was contemplated or pending or
filed?
Were persons not joined in the original action allowed to intervene?
At what stage of the proceedings were intervenors allowed? Before
judgment? After judgment?
How were intervenors notified to participate?
How were the intervenors' claims handled?
Was a master appointed to hear the various claims?
Were claims other than intervenors' approved and paid for?
Was a jury trial held? If so, did the jury hear the various claims of the
members of the class?
What proof was made to satisfy the requirement of adequacy of representation at trial?
What procedural method was used to hear and determine amounts due
each member of the class?
How were attorneys' fees handled in this case? Was the fee taken out of
the class funds? Did the intervenors contribute to the fee?
Were discovery procedures used to determine the persons in the class?
Were instructions given in the case? If so, may I have copies?
Were there any particular evidentiary problems involved regarding the
class suit aspect of the case?
Were any objections made by the adversary as to any individual claims?
If so, how were they handled?
How were costs handled? Did the members of the class contribute?
parties are so numerous that it is highly impractical to bring all having common
questions of fact or law before the court.
"I am presently engaged in a research project dealing with the Procedural Problems
of the Class Suit in order to determine the feasibility of the class suit device to handle
multiple party claims where many persons have matters in common . . . • As a part of
that project I am seeking comments concerning the worth of the spurious class device.
Since you are in a position to have knowledge of the multitude of problems involved,
having recently had occasion to hear the case of . • . , I would deeply appreciate
such comments as you may have concerning the class suit • • • ."
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If a master ·or receiver was appointed how were his fees taken care of?
Several observations can be made concerning the results of the survey:
I. The expense and consumption of time in class actions seem to be so
great that at least 50% of the cases were settled or dismissed. One case4 became so expensive and time-consuming that original counsel withdrew,
substitute counsel was employed and fared no better, and the case was
finally dismissed.5 Other cases were settled perhaps short of indicated value. 6
2. No notice of any kind was given to any member of the class prior to
or during trial in any of the cases surveyed, although in two7 cases notification was given after judgment to permit claimants to participate in the
judgment.
3. Discovery and pre-trial procedures were not utilized to any great
extent. In one case,8 pre-trial would have been very helpful. In another
case9 involving the Fair Labor Standards Act interrogatories were sent to
the employer only to determine the amounts due.
4. While intervention seems to have been allowable,10 intervention did
not often occur. 11
5. Attorneys' fees were, in a number of instances, paid out of the fund
recovered or were paid by the losing defendant.12
6. To determine the claims of the several members, the court has at
times referred the matter to a master13 or trustee,14 and has sometimes
used the technique of mathematical computation. 15 The judgment in two
Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
Letter from Hirsch E. Soble, Esq., August 1, 1960. Mr. Soble states: "In a case
such as this where the financial resources of the parties were so far apart, the full
utilization of the discovery procedures can often result in injustice. I have witnessed
this more than once. But that is the price we pay for civilization."
6 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13
F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Co., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa.
1948); Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio 1943).
7 Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. App. 1952); Cohon v. Oscar
L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958).
s Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., supra note 7. The case was tried before California adopted the pre-trial practice. Counsel indicated that "obviously, a pre-trial conference
would have been advantageous because a lot of these issues, so laboriously argued in
the appellate court, could have been raised and determined at such a conference."
9 Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio 1943) (FLSA).
10 Ibid. Heffernan v. Bennett&: Armour Co., 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. App. 1952); Cohon v.
Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958).
11 Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., supra note 9. Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co.,
supra note 10.
12 Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., supra note 9; Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co.,
supra note 10; Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958).
13 Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., supra note 10.
14 Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958).
15 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945).
4
5
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cases provided for the order and procedure by which the claims should be
proved. 16
7. The petitions filed in the cases were predominantly in the general
form, alleging that the claimants were too numerous to be joined and that
the action was brought by the named plaintiffs for and in behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.17
8. Counsel uniformly indicated that there were benefits to be derived
from maintaining an action in the class form. 18
One of the most detailed _?:"eplies was that of Branko M. Steiner, Esq.,
counsel in Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co.,19 a case which well illustrates the
effective use of a class action. In that case "hundreds of persons," including
the plaintiff, purchased wall-to-wall carpeting and installations from the
defendant, Paris Co., and were charged a certain selling price, plus a
Retailers' Occupation Tax. Before the institution of the present action the
Paris company had brought an action to declare the collection of such taxes
illegal and its cause was sustained by the Supreme Court of Illinois.20
Thereafter, the present suit was brought by the plaintiff "in his own behalf
and in behalf of others similarly situated" to compel the defendant to repay all funds theretofore collected as the illegal taxes to the respective
customers of the defendant. The petition filed was most carefully drafted.
It recited, in part:
"5. The customers of this defendant for whom this action is prosecuted, are all similarly situated, having since 1949 purchased wall to
wall carpeting from said defendant, and each having paid to it, a
tax as a separate item, in addition to the charge made by defendant to
each customer for the carpeting and padding, and the installation
thereof. The taxes in question known as the Retailers' Occupation
Tax, were separately passed on to, and paid by such customers to the
defendant. The sums representing said charge for tax so paid by
plaintiff and other customers to the defendant, represented a common
fund, and in reality belonged to the defendant's customers who paid
or deposited such taxes from which said fund was accumulated and
was held by the defendant in trust. Such customers for and on behalf
16 Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. App. 1952); Cohon v.
Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958).
17 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Schempf v. Armour &: Co., 5
F.R.D. 294 (D. Minn. 1946); Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio
1943); Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., supra note 16; Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co.,
supra note 16.
18 One counsel replied: "I firmly believe a class action is effective in handling a
multi-party problem where the members of the class are numerous. If one could not
file a class action in such instances, it might well effectively preclude the prosecution
of a meritorious claim." Letter from J. Benton Tulley, Esq., August 2, 1960.
111 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958).
20 Oscar L. Paris Co. v. Lyons, 8 Ill. 2d 590, 134 N.E.2d 755 (1956).
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of whom the plaintiff prosecutes the instant cause of action, constitute
a class, and since there are hundreds of them they are at this time unknown to plaintiff and too numerous, it becomes highly impractical
~o bring them all before the court. This action will prevent and avoid
a multiplicity of suits. Plaintiff can and will prosecute this action by
able counsel and all members of the class will be adequately and
fully represented, whereas individually the tax as to any one individual
would not be large enough to warrant any such litigation to recover
it. One decision can and will determine the rights of all members of
the class since the same issue is common to all such customers. The
same common relief is sought by and for all said class of customers....
"10. Plaintiff files this suit in his own behalf and in behalf of
others similarly situated who may care to join herein and pay their
proportionate share of the costs, fees and expenses entailed in the prosecution of this suit."
A trustee was finally appointed by the court and in the decree the
trustee was ordered to have published a notice to all the represented customers. The "Notice to Customers of Oscar L. Paris Company" was in the
following form:
"If you purchased carpeting and the installation thereof from
Oscar L. Paris Company during the period from January I, 1949 to and
including September 30, 1955, you may be entitled to a refund in full
of the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax applicable to such sale.
Bring or send your paid invoice, cancelled check or similar evidence
of such purchase to the office of [trustee]. This should be done before
the 30th day of September, 1960, or the liability of Oscar L. Paris
Company to make such refunds shall terminate."

The trustee was ordered to furnish to the defendant a list of answering
claimants within ten days after the limitation period set by the court and
published in the above notice and the defendant was ordered to furnish to
the trustee the amounts necessary to pay all such answering claimants. The
trustee was further ordered to file a report with the court detailing the
number of claims filed, amounts claimed and paid, amounts claimed but
unpaid, and the amount of the reimbursement fund remaining in the
possession of the defendant. Upon receipt of the report the court would
then enter an order for the costs and expenses of obtaining the recovery,
including attorneys' fees and expenses.
The somewhat summary trustee proceedings seem justified since the
"amounts due each of the individual members of the class were so comparatively insignificant that it would have been impossible, from a practical viewpoint, for each member of the class to file a separate suit for the
amount due." 21 The tax-refunds sum already in the hands of the defendant
21 Letter from Branko M. Steiner, Esq., counsel for plaintiffs in customers' refund
suit, Cobon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958).
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makes this a hybrid-type representative suit case, and the judgment therefore
is res judicata. But what if there had been no fund? Without a fund, what
would be the technical legal effect under due process doctrines if the
published notice cancelled defendant's whole liability as to any absentee
parties who failed to make their claims in the pending suit against defendant by September 30, 1960? In other words, could the personal rights of the
individual "represented" claimants to sue separately similarly be terminated
by the court if the situation were of the "spurious" type? It could be done
and the spurious type class suit made a more useful device if there existed
state legislation authorizing the trial court to make such an order upon its
finding of "due representation" and "adequate protection" of rights of
represented potential claimants, assuming that such legislation would be
valid, and that judgments entered upon notice under it could satisfy constitutional due process requirements.
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